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I. INTRODUCTION
By 1940, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws no longer was content to revise the then existing
uniform acts that related to commercial transactions., Rather, the
National Conference joined with the American Law Institute in an
effort to promulgate proposed new legislation containing principles, policies, and definitions common to a number of separate aspects of mercantile commerce, including the sale and financing of
goods and methods of payment.2 Like all human creations, the re1. See Schnader, A Short History of the Preparationand Enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 U. MiAMI L. REv. 1, 2 (1967). Among the uniform acts that the National Conference proposed to supplant were the Uniform Sales Act, Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law, Uniform Bills of Lading Act, Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, Uniform Conditional Sales Act, and Uniform Trust Receipts Act. See
id.
2. See 1 U.L.A. xv-xvii (master ed. 1976).
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suiting product-the Uniform Commercial Codes3-imperfectly
achieved the goals of its sponsors. In particular, important questions have arisen about the proper interplay among various articles
of the Code, 4 each of which was drafted by different people addressing different, and sometimes competing, concerns.5 The sponsors answered some of these questions by amending the Code,' and
a consensus has developed on others.7 Other questions remain
without a generally accepted answer."
This Article discusses and attempts to answer some of the remaining questions-those that arise from the interaction of Article
9 (secured transactions) with Article 6 (bulk transfers). Specifically, this Article analyzes the impact of bulk transfers on secured
financing by clarifying the rights of a secured party whose collateral is or has been sold as part of a bulk transfer. That these rights
are in doubt is not surprising. The primary purpose of Article 6 is
to prevent a merchant from defrauding his unsecured creditors.9 In
contrast, Article 9 sets forth the rights of secured creditors. These
rights are shaped, at least in part, by a desire to prevent a type of
fraud entirely different from the fraud that Article 6 addresses.
Unfortunately, the case law adds little to a principled reconciliation of the competing policies of the two articles. Instead of ana3. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to sections of and comments to the Uniform Commercial Code ("Code" or "U.C.C.") are to the 1978 official text.
4. See, e.g., Dolan, Good Faith Purchase and Warehouse Receipts: Thoughts on the
Interplay of Articles 2, 7, and 9 of the UCC, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1978); Leary & Schmitt,
Some Bad News and Some Good News from Articles 3 and 4, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 620-24
(1982) (relationship of § 3-418 and § 4-213); Peters & Jackson, Quest for Uncertainty: A
Proposalfor Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907 (1978).
5. See generally 1 U.LA. xviii-xxiii (master ed. 1976) (short drafting history of Code).
6. For example, the 1972 amendments to Article 9 added § 9-114, which explains the
filing requirements of § 2-326(3). See Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Review Committee for Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Final Report
58, 223 (1971).
7. See, e.g., National Say. & Trust Co. v. Park Corp., 722 F.2d 1303, 1306 (6th Cir.
1983) (relationship of § 3-418 and § 4-213), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1916 (1984) .
8. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-15 (2d ed. 1980) (authors, like courts, disagree about the relationship of § 2-403 and § 9-307).
9. See infra notes 18-47 and accompanying text. Article 6 does not contain an affirmative grant of rights to unsecured creditors. Rather, it renders certain transfers "ineffective"
against creditors of the transferor, U.C.C. §§ 6-104, 6-105, including both secured and unsecured creditors. See id. § 1-201(12). Any additional rights that a secured creditor acquires
as a consequence of an "ineffective" transfer are largely duplicative of his rights as a secured
party. See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text; U.C.C. § 9-501(1); cf. Baker, Bulk
Transfers Act-Patch, Bury, or Renovate?, 38 Bus. LAW. 1771, 1786 (1983) (secured parties'
rights are not affected by bulk transfers).
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lyzing those policies and carefully scrutinizing the text of the Code,
courts have determined the rights of the secured party in a bulk
transfer by, for example, needlessly changing the meanings of defined terms in Article 6 or Article 9 to reach a desired result. 10 As a
consequence, some of the important judicial opinions in the area
not only interpret the Code improperly but also reach undesirable
and incorrect results. In doing so, they create needless costs. Most
secured parties whose collateral is inventory and many secured
parties whose collateral is equipment now face significant additional risks; the lawyers who advise them or who represent potential buyers in bulk now face increased uncertainty.
Although this uncertainty has been exacerbated considerably
by a recent Fifth Circuit case, National Bank v. West Texas
Wholesale Supply (In re McBee), to some extent uncertainty inheres in the Code. The existing literature on the Code is of little
aid in understanding the issues and resolving the disputes that
may arise when a secured party's collateral is or has been the subject of a bulk transfer. The extensive commentary on Article 9 has
all but ignored the interaction of that article with Article 6. Although the Article 6 commentary is considerably less voluminous,
Article 6 long has been recognized as needing amendment 2 and
increasingly is the object of criticism. During the past few years, an
American Bar Association committee and a national organization
of commercial lawyers have proffered extensive, specific amendments to Article 6.11 Others have argued that amendments are inadequate and that Article 6 should be rewritten or perhaps repealed.1 4 In response, the National Conference has appointed a
10. E.g., National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d
1316, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983) (definition of "purchaser" in § 6-110); National Bank v.
Frydlewicz, 67 Mich. App. 417, 421, 241 N.W.2d 471, 473 (1976) (definition of "transferee in
bulk" in § 9-301(1)(c)).
11. 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983).
12. See, e.g., Hawkland, Remedies of Bulk Transfer Creditors Where There Has Been
Compliance with Article 6, 74 CoL L.J. 257 (1969); Levit, Bulk Transfers-Stepchildof the
Uniform Commercial Code?, 46 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 694 (1971); Rapson, Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Problems and Pitfalls in Conducting Bulk Sales, 68 CoM. L.J. 226
(1963). For a compendium of Article 6 ambiguities and problems, see Brines, Article Six
Bulk Transfers: Thirty Years of Confusion, 86 W. VA. L. REv. 29 (1983).
13. Hawkland, Proposed Revisions to Article 6, 38 Bus. LAW. 1729 (1983) (recommendations of ABA Uniform Commercial Code Committee); Braunstein, The President'sPage,
84 CoM. L.J. 48 (1979) (summary of proposals of Commercial Law League of America).
14. See Baker, supra note 9 (proposed renovation of Article 6); Rapson, U.C.C. Article
6: Should It Be Revised or "Deep-Sixed"?, 38 Bus. LAW. 1753, 1769 (1983) ("statutory euthanasia" may be in order); cf. Law Revision Commission of British Columbia, LRC 67,
Report on Bulk Sales Legislation (1983) (recommending repeal of Sale of Goods in Bulk
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drafting committee to revise the article.15 The proffered amendments address a vast array of bulk transfer problems that have
arisen in the reported cases; nevertheless, the effect of a bulk
transfer on the rights of an Article 9 secured party has escaped
serious discussion. This Article seeks to fill that void.
Part II of this Article explains the policies underlying Article 6
and Article 9. It not only demonstrates that the policies do not
conflict but also reveals remarkable similarities between them.
Part III develops the rights that a secured party (perfected or unperfected) whose collateral is sold as part of a bulk transfer may
exercise against the buyer in bulk. Certain of my conclusions differ
dramatically from statements in McBee, but they are fully consistent with both the language of the Code and the policies explored
in part II. Part IV explores the competing claims of a seller's secured party and of persons whose interests derive from the buyer
in bulk, including lien creditors, other secured parties, and subbuyers. In resolving these priority contests, this Article rejects the
reasoning and results of McBee and develops an analysis that can
be used to resolve similar disputes that may arise in contexts unrelated to bulk sales. Inasmuch as the National Conference currently
is reconsidering Article 6, the conclusion suggests a few revisions
that would clarify the interaction of that article with Article 9.
II. THE POLICIES OF ARTICLES 6 AND 9

Understanding the policies that underlie Articles 6 and 9 is
necessary to integrate the operation of the two articles. Interestingly, each of the articles seeks to prevent a particular kind of injury to creditors, and each does so by requiring public notice of a
conveyance of personal property.-6 These common elements have
caused confusion in the official comments to the Code, 17 apparAct; Act subsequently was repealed).
15. The author is the American Bar Association's Advisor to the National Conference's drafting committee to revise Article 6. This Article expresses the author's personal
views, which are not necessarily those of the ABA.
16. The notice requirements of Article 9 apply to security interests in fixtures, which
are real estate, as well as in personal property. U.C.C. §§ 9-102(1)(a), 9-313(1)(a). The notice
requirements of Article 6 apply to certain transfers of "equipment," id. § 6-102(2), which is
a category of "goods," id. § 9-109(2), which includes "fixtures," id. § 9-105(1)(h). This Article does not consider problems that may arise from a transfer of goods that are or become
fixtures.
17. Comment 2 to § 6-103 suggests that the reason Article 6 excludes transfers for
security is that Article 9 regulates security interests. The comment to § 9-111 is more cogent. Observing that "the bulk transfer type of fraud has not often made its appearance in
the security field," the comment to § 9-111 concludes that "[s]ince compliance with the bulk
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ently without adversely affecting the case law. This part distinguishes the purposes underlying the notice provisions of Article 6
from those underlying Article 9's public notice system and shows
how the consequences that each article imposes for failure to give
notice relate to those purposes.
A.

The Bulk Sales Risk

Article 6 addresses a fraud that apparently was common
around the turn of the century: A merchant would acquire his
stock in trade on credit, then sell his entire inventory ("in bulk")
and abscond with the proceeds."8 Even though the buyer acquired
the merchant's business assets, he would not ipso facto become
obliged to pay the merchant's debts. Only by affirmatively assuming those debts would the buyer become personally liable for
them. 19 The merchant's creditors had a right to sue the merchant
transfer laws is onerous and expensive, legitimate financing transactions should not be required to comply when there is no reason to believe that other creditors will be prejudiced."
To the extent that Article 6 is intended to notify creditors of impending preferential transfers, U.C.C. § 6-107(2)(c) (notice must state "whether the transfer is to pay existing debts"),
the exclusion of all transfers for security, even those made to secure existing debts, minimizes the realization of that intent. Early drafts of Article 6 excluded bulk transfers that
were for the sole purpose of securing repayment of new value, but included bulk transfers
that secured existing debts. See, e.g., id. § 6-103(1) (official draft 1952). One commentator
on an early draft observed that the policing of preferences "may well be the most important
contribution of the [Bulk Sales] Article, and it is a worthwhile contribution." Miller, The
Effect of the Bulk Sales Article on Existing Commercial Practices, 16 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 267, 283 (1951). In December 1952, the Code's Editorial Board recommended the
elimination of all "bulk securities transactions as distinguished from bulk sales transactions," because their inclusion "would interfere with the [intended] operation of Article 9."
Recommendations of the Editorial Board for Changes in the Text of the Uniform Commercial Code 4 (1952), reprinted in 15 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 354 (E. Kelly comp.
1984) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C. Drafts].
18. See Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Economic Adjustment, 77 U. PA. L. REV.
72, 75-78 (1928). Comment 4 to § 6-101 refers to the merchant who sells his inventory,
pockets the proceeds, and leaves his creditors unpaid as "the major bulk sales risk, [whose]
prevention is the central purpose of the [previously] existing bulk sales laws and of this
Article [6]." Another form of commercial fraud that Article 6 addresses is the practice of the
merchant who sells his inventory to a friend and pays creditors less than what they are
owed, with the hope of "com[ing] back into the business through the back door some time in
the future." U.C.C. § 6-101 comment 2. This is a fraudulent conveyance and can be set aside
under the law of fraudulent conveyances. Id., comment 3; see infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Chicago Specialty Shoe Co. ex rel. Stein & Rosenthal v. Uhwat, 197 Ill.
App. 460 (1916) (even a buyer who fails to comply with the bulk sales act does not become
personally liable for the seller's debts); Rothchild Bros. v. Trewella, 36 Wash. 679, 79 P. 480
(1905) (same). The rule remains the same today and usually is invoked in the corporate
context: when one company sells all its assets to another company, the purchaser is not
liable for the debts and liabilities of the seller. See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules,
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on the debts, but the right to recover was of little practical value.
The merchant-debtor often disappeared after the sale; and even if
he were found, in personam jurisdiction over him was not readily
available.2 0 Even creditors who succeeded in obtaining a judgment
often were unable to recover their debts because the defrauding
seller had spent or hidden the sale proceeds. Nor did the creditors
ordinarily have recourse to the merchandise sold. Because one person's creditors cannot appropriate another person's property to
satisfy their claims,2 ' the transfer of the inventory to an innocent
buyer effectively immunized the goods from the reach of the
seller's creditors.22 The creditors of a seller in bulk thus might be
left without a means to satisfy their claims.
To a limited extent, the law of fraudulent conveyances ameliorated the plight of the creditors. 3 Ordinarily, creditors have no
Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 308 (3d Cir. 1985); see also 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122, at 188 (rev. perm.ed. 1983) and cases cited therein. This rule
is subject to four generally recognized exceptions: when the purchaser expressly or impliedly
agrees to assume the seller's debts, when the transaction is fraudulently entered into to
escape liability, when the purchasing company is merely a continuation of the seller, and
when the transaction amounts to a de facto merger or consolidation. PhiladelphiaElec., 762
F.2d at 308-09; see also 15 FLETCHER, supra § 7122, at 189 and cases cited therein. Some
courts have developed an additional exception in product liability cases. See infra note 155
and accompanying text.
20. Under the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878), a state "could render
a judgment binding a defendant personally only if he was physically present and served with
process while in the forum State." Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of
Extended Jurisdictionin Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 535. Over the years, the Court expanded the concept of the defendant's "presence," so that by 1945,
states could exercise extraterritorial in personamn jurisdiction in basically four kinds of
cases: claims against corporations "doing business" in the state; claims against nonresident motorists arising from accidents in the state; claims against individuals, partnerships, or unincorporated associations "doing business" in the state arising from that instate business; and actions for divorce or annulment.
R. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 4.01, at 4-3 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
21. See, e.g., Post v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 176 Pa. 297, 35 A. 111 (1896)
(creditor requires no lien on property if title and possession pass from debtor to buyer prior
to levy); Davis v. Turner, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 422, 426 (1848) (Baldwin, J.) (a person's creditors
"can subject to their demands only the right which remains in him, and not that from which
he has lawfully parted"). This principle remains true. See, e.g., Carolina Power & Light Co.
v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (applying California law) ("creditor may
attach only his debtor's actual interest in property that the debtor holds"). Garrard Glenn
stated the obverse: "the creditor is entitled to realize on whatever property the debtor may
himself be able to realize on. In other words, whatever the debtor can lawfully alienate, that
in turn the creditor can reach." G. GLENN, THE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF CREDITORS RESPECTING THEIR DEBTOR'S PROPERTY

§ 25, at 23 (1915).

22. See Billig, supra note 18, at 80 and cases cited therein.
23. "[A]t the beginning of this century, the law of fraudulent conveyances was a mosaic of statutes and decisions, which had developed around the Statute of Elizabeth [Statute

of Fraudulent Conveyances, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571)]." 1 G. GLENN,

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
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right to insist that their debtor maintain his assets in a particular
form.

4

Nevertheless, the law long has prohibited the conversion of

an entire stock of inventory into easily transportable cash when a
debtor makes the exchange for the purpose of preventing his creditors from satisfying their claims. Indeed, the sale of one's entire
stock once constituted prima facie evidence of a fraudulent conveyance. 25 In much the same way as it does now, the law of fraudulent conveyances enabled turn-of-the-century creditors in some
cases to reach property that their debtor had fraudulently conveyed. A buyer, including a buyer in bulk, who was in league with a
defrauding seller or who paid less than a fair price, took the goods
subject to the right of the defrauded creditors to apply the goods
toward the satisfaction of their claims against the seller-debtor.28
Not all buyers in bulk fail to act in good faith or give insufficient
value. Some buyers pay a fair price and are wholly and justifiably
unaware that the seller intends to pocket the proceeds and disappear. Fraudulent conveyance law has provided no remedy against
the goods in the hands of those persons who buy in good faith and
for adequate value. 7 The creditors' only remedy has been against
§ 58, at 80-81 (rev. ed. 1940). Professor Glenn's two-volume treatise,
which remains the most extensive discussion of fraudulent conveyance law, discusses the
early development of that law at some length. Id. §§ 58-61. Modern law has been influenced
by the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), which 25 states have adopted since its
AND PREFERENCES

promulgation in 1918. UNiF. FRAUDULENT

CONVEYANcE

ACT, 7A U.L.A. 427 (master ed. 1985).

In 1984, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved and
recommended for enactment the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) to replace the
UFCA. Id.
24. E.g., Davis v. Turner, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 422, 426 (1848).
25. See, e.g., Walbrun v. Babbitt, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 577, 581 (1872); Pennell v. Robinson, 164 N.C. 257, 259, 80 S.E. 417, 418-19 (1913); 1 G. GLENN, supra note 23, § 309, at 537;
cf. Twyne's case, 3 Coke 80, 81, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 812 (Star Chamber 1601) (quoting maxim
dolus versatur in generalibus (fraud deals in generalities), the court finds the general transfer of a debtor's property without exception of necessities to be a badge of fraud); Clark,
The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REv. 505, 512-13 (1977)
(exchange of liquid assets for illiquid assets to hinder creditors violates the general ideal of'
"[n]onhindrance of the enforcement of valid legal obligations against oneself, in connection
with transfers of one's property," which fraudulent conveyance law embodies). But see Hart
v. Roney, 93 Md. 432, 433, 49 A. 661, 662 (1901).
26. See Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571); U.F.C.A. §§ 9, 10,
7A U.L.A. 577-78, 630 (master ed. 1985); 1 G. GLENN, supra note 23, §§ 67, 274. Creditors
may enforce their rights through a representative, such as a bankruptcy trustee. See 11
U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982); see also id. § 548 (bankruptcy trustee may avoid a fraudulent transfer even if it is unavoidable by a particular creditor).
27. The Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571), does not extend to
any property that is "upon good Consideration and bona fide lawfully conveyed. . . to any
Person . . . not having at the Time of such Conveyance ...
any Manner of Notice or
Knowledge of such Covin, Fraud, or Collusion." U.F.C.A. § 9, 7A U.L.A. 577 (master ed.
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the seller, and that remedy may be, in effect, no remedy at all.
The plight of creditors at the turn of the century differs significantly from the situation that confronts contemporary lenders.
Today, a lender is able to investigate a debtor's creditworthiness
more easily and comprehensively than it could eight decades ago.
Credit reporting companies now provide credit histories at little
cost; the use of certified financial statements is widespread; and a
single search of the public real estate and personal property
records will disclose most encumbrances on the debtor's assets.
Aided by the information these sources disclose, a creditor is able
to make a better-reasoned decision about whether to extend credit
than it could in 1900.
In addition, changes in the law now afford creditors greater
opportunities to collect their debts. Dramatic developments in the
constitutional theory of jurisdiction 28 coupled with the universal
promulgation of state long-arm statutes and rules" have greatly
improved the possibility of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the
debtor who flees to another state. Moreover, creditors of a
merchant no longer face the choice of extending unsecured credit
or no credit at all. Retaining an interest in inventory to secure its
1985), permits aggrieved creditors to avoid a fraudulent conveyance "as against any person
except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the
purchase." Accord id. § 10, 7A U.L.A. 630. McCoid, Constructively Fraudulent Conveyances: Transfers for Inadequate Consideration,62 Tx. L. REv. 639 (1983), examines the
development of the branch of fraudulent conveyance law that deals with transfers for inadequate consideration. "Fair consideration" itself includes a good faith requirement. U.F.C.A.
§ 3, 7A U.L.A. 448-49 (master ed. 1985). Regarding that requirement, see generally Note,
Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARv. L. REv. 495 (1983). The new Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act carries forward the protection of transferees "who took in good
faith and for a reasonably equivalent value." U.F.T.A. § 8(a), 7A U.L.A. 576 (master ed.
1985); see also 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1982) (good faith transferee for value has a lien on or may
retain any interest transferred to the extent of value given).
28. In 1945 the Supreme Court ruled that due process no longer required a defendant's presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court as a prerequisite to rendition of
an in personam judgment against him. Instead, "due process requires only that. . . a defendant. . . have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
29. Although "[s]everal years passed after InternationalShoe before state legislatures
began expanding the range of their courts' territorial jurisdiction[,]" every state has since
"acquired, either by statute or court rule, provisions for invoking jurisdiction over nonresident individuals and corporations in most kinds of cases in which it would be constitutionally permissible." R. CASAD, supra note 20, T4.01, at 4-3 to -4. These statutes and rules are
collected in id., at A-32 to -102.
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price has become relatively simple and inexpensive under Article
9.30
The present business and legal context may enable creditors
to protect themselves adequately, so that a special statute addressed to bulk sales is not an efficient method of deterring
fraud."1 But creditors of the 1900's lacked the advantages afforded
to contemporary creditors. Without the benefit of credit reporting
services, long-arm statutes, and inventory liens, trade creditors
were perceived to be particularly vulnerable to the risk of fraudulently intended bulk sales.
Pressed by the National Association of Credit Men,3 2 state legislatures attempted to minimize the bulk sales risk through the enactment of antifraud legislation. 3 The bulk sales acts took a variety of forms, but they all imposed upon the buyer in bulk the duty
to protect the seller's unsecured creditors.3 4 Typically, the buyer
fulfilled his duty by notifying the creditors of the impending transfer.3 5 In some states, the buyer was obliged in addition to disburse
the sale proceeds to the seller's creditors.3 8 The buyer's failure to
comply with the statute subjected the transferred property to the
30. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1). "The conditional sale remained, through most of the nineteenth century, a matter for occasional judicial or scholarly speculation, of no commercial
importance whatever." 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 3.2 at 67
(1965). Although purchase money security interests since have become commonplace, starting with the financing of industrial equipment and consumer goods in the late nineteenth
century, see id. at 67-68, for reasons yet to be fully explained they are still widely unused by
those who are the primary intended beneficiaries of bulk sales legislation: trade creditors,
see Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:A Review of Current Theories,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 n.10 (1981).
31. See, e.g., A. ScHwARTz & R. ScoT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 506 (1982) (absent
more data, the burdensome transaction costs imposed by Article 6 are difficult to justify);
Rapson, supra note 14, passim. The ABA subcommittee that considered Article 6 revisions
rejected the view that Article 6 should be repealed as well as the view that the article should
be strengthened and expanded. See Hawkland, supra note 13, at 1730-31. The National
Conference's drafting committee, see supra text accompanying note 15, is likely to arrive at
a similar middle ground and leave unchanged the basic scope and operation of Article 6.
Accordingly, this Article assumes that some version of a bulk transfer law will remain in
effect and does not address the utility of bulk transfer legislation.
32. The Association "consisted ofi the credit department representatives of business
houses scattered all over the United States." Billig, supra note 18, at 81.
33. See id. at 81-88 (chronicling the campaign for bulk sales legislation at the turn of
the century).
34. See, e.g., id. at 72-74.
35. See, e.g., id.
36. This type of statute became known as the "Pennsylvania form." Id. at 73-74; cf.
U.C.C. § 6-106 (optional section obligating transferee to apply consideration to pay transferor's debts).
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claims of the seller's creditors37 and, in some states, imposed personal liability on the buyer."8
Like the bulk sales statutes that it supersedes, Article 6 rests
upon two premises: special legislation is desirable to minimize the
risk that a merchant might use a bulk sale to perpetrate a fraud on
his creditors, and the most effective deterrent to fraud is the imposition of the monitoring duty on the buyer in bulk. 9 Like its predecessors, Article 6 requires the buyer to notify the seller's creditors
that a bulk sale will occur. ' 0 His failure to notify renders the transfer "ineffective against any creditor of the transferor,"4 ' thereby
enabling the seller's creditors to reach the property through judicial process. 4 2 In addition, optional section 6-106 makes the buyer
responsible for the proper application of the sale proceeds to the
seller's creditors and has been a basis for imposing personal liability on the buyer who fails to comply.4' Worthy of particular note is
the fact that Article 6, like its nonuniform predecessors, creates
rights against the goods and the buyer even when the buyer acts in
good faith and pays adequate value. The article thereby extends
the rights of aggrieved creditors beyond those afforded by the law
of fraudulent conveyances. Like fraudulent conveyance law, Article
6 runs directly counter to a basic legal principle: B's property is
not liable for A's debts." Even more striking, however, is that Article 6 imposes liability on the noncomplying good faith buyer in
bulk, in the absence of any fraud whatsoever. That is, Article 6
imposes a penalty: regardless of the bona fides of the parties, a
buyer in bulk may pay full value for goods and lose them or their
value to the seller's creditors merely because he neglects to comply
37.

See, e.g., 1 G.

GLENN,

38. See, e.g., L. VOLD,

supra note 23, § 314.

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES

§ 81, at 416-17 (2d ed. 1959).

39. See U.C.C. § 6-101 comments.
40. Id. §3 6-105, 6-107.
41. Id. § 6-105.
42. See, e.g., American Express Co. v. Bomar Shoe Co., 125 Ga. App. 408, 409-10, 187
S.E.2d 922, 924 (1972) (aggrieved creditor has any remedy he might have had against the
transferor or the goods); Fico, Inc. v. Ghingher, 287 Md. 150, 157, 411 A.2d 430, 435 (1980)
(in dictum, aggrieved creditor may levy, attach, or garnish the goods); U.C.C. § 6-104 comment 2; U.C.C. § 6-111 comment 2; Annot., 18 A.L.R.4th 1090 (1982).
43. See Darby v. Ewing's Home Furnishings, 278 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
Some authorities disagree with this reading of § 6-106. See, e.g., 6 W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 6-106:02 (1984); see also Petereit v. Mid-West Marko, Inc., 564
S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (in dictum, no personal liability). Some courts have
imposed personal liability on the transferee without relying on the local enactment of § 6106. See infra note 162.
44. See supra note 21.
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5
with the notice provisions of Article 6."
The possibility of having to pay for goods and not enjoying
their use, or of paying twice for the goods, is supposed to induce
the buyer in bulk to perform his statutory duty of notifying creditors and, in some states, applying the proceeds of the sale to their
claims.46 Performance of those duties, in turn, is supposed to help
prevent the seller-debtor from utilizing a bulk sale to defraud his
creditors.

B.

The Problems of Nonpossessory Liens

Like Article 6, Article 9 presumes that public notice can prevent fraud. The fraud that Article 9 addresses arises from nonpossessory interests in personal property. For centuries the law of
personal property has considered the separation of title from possession as a "fruitful . . .source of deception. 4 8 Who is deceived
by a secret security interest in, say, the debtor's inventory of
shoes? First, absent public notice, persons who extend credit to the
debtor may be misled into thinking that the debtor owns the shoes
free and clear. Acting on that misapprehension, a creditor may extend credit secured by the shoes, only to learn later that another
creditor has prior, superior rights. Or a creditor may extend unsecured credit, believing that even if the particular shoes may not
45. The enactment of the first bulk sales act, LA. LAws 1896, No. 94, resulted from
"dissatisfaction with what was considered a defect in the law of fraudulent conveyances, i.e.,
the situation where the purchaser of a stock of goods could not be proved to have had any
fraudulent intent even though there was clearly fraud on the part of the seller." Miller,
supra note 17, at 268. Although the good faith buyer may pay twice for the same goods, the
seller must indemnify him for any loss suffered as a consequence of his failure to comply
with Article 6. See Johnson v. Mid States Screw & Bolt Co., 733 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1984).
In explaining why the buyer should have a right to indemnity and should not bear the
ultimate loss, the court states, "The Bulk Sales Act is not punitive in nature." Id. at 1537.
The Article 6 "penalty" that the text refers to is the imposition of liability on the buyer in
the first instance. Id.
46. No one denies that Article 6 may be a trap for the unwary, but honest, bulk buyer.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 6-101 comment 5 (acknowledging the danger). Anecdotes abound about
attorneys who learned of Article 6 only after the bulk buyers they represented had lost
goods to creditors of the bulk seller.
47. Creditors may set aside a complying bulk sale if it is voidable under fraudulent
conveyance law, for example, if the seller conducted the sale for the purpose of defrauding
his creditors and the buyer knew of the fraud. See Boss v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 288
S.E.2d 559 (Ga. 1982); U.C.C. § 1-103; id. § 6-101 comment 3; cf. Miller, supra note 17, at
277 (discussing 1950 proposed final draft of Code). Nevertheless, I have heard attorneys
express concern that Article 6 actually facilitates fraud. They argue that dishonest parties
who comply with Article 6 can use the fact of their compliance as evidence of their good
faith and thereby avoid liability under fraudulent conveyance law.
48. Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337, 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812).
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be available for eventual satisfaction of the debt, the proceeds that
the debtor receives upon their sale will be.49
A second group that may be disadvantaged by a nonpossessory
security interest in the inventory consists of creditors who seek to
satisfy their claims by judicial process on the shoes, only to find
that the shoes are encumbered. These creditors may not have extended credit in reliance on the debtor's possession of the shoes;
nevertheless, the law has made secret security interests ineffective
against them.5 0 The most commonly proffered reason is that a secret grant of a security interest may be a ruse by which a debtor
arranges with an ally to shield his assets from his creditors.5 1 The
debtor treats the shoes as his own and enjoys all their benefits,
including the right to sell them for profit, yet none of his creditors
can reach them, save the secured party. The secured party, however, is content to leave his security in a precarious position-in
the control of the debtor, who may diminish its value or dispose of
it altogether and dissipate the proceeds. In short, the parties' actions contradict their words. The parties say the shoes stand as
collateral, but the assertion is particularly dubious when the transaction is secret and is revealed only when a competing creditor as49. See, e.g., Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 271, 82 N.E. 127, 128 (1907)
(general creditors are presumed to have dealt with debtor in reliance on his absolute ownership of the stock on hand). A straightforward premise underlies the common law notion that
retention of possession is deceptive or fraudulent: possession of goods implies unencumbered ownership. In a legal system in which a contrary premise prevails and in which no
inferences regarding the state of the title arise from possession of goods, retention of possession would not be fraudulent. That creditors actually rely on the debtor's possession of personal property in deciding whether to extend credit long has been considered dubious. See,
e.g., Davis v. Turner, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 422, 441 (1848) (Baldwin, J.) ("there is something
rather loose and indefinite in the idea of a delusive credit gained by the possession of personal property"); M. BIGELow, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 374 (1911) (general
credit is not based upon the debtor's ownership of any particular piece of property); Coogan,
Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012, 1033-36 (1978); Phillips,
Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Filing Under Article 9, 59 B.U.L. REv. 1, 34-43
(1979).
50. See, e.g., Martin v. Mathiot, 14 Serg. & Rawle 214, 215 (Pa. 1826) (creditor of
conditional vendee); U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
51. See, e.g., Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275, 280, 282 (Pa. 1819) (Gibson, J.); 1
G. GLENN, supra note 23, at 606; cf. Davis v. Turner, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 422, 426-27 (1848)
(Baldwin, J.) ("The fraud is therefore to be found in the falsehood of the transaction; in the
pretence of a sale when there is none; in the reservation of an interest for the grantor under
the cover of a transmission of his right to the grantee.") (sale-leaseback of chattels); Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 361-63 (1925) (reservation of dominion inconsistent with effective disposition of title renders transfer of accounts void). According to Professor Glenn,
"There is another element as well, because, seeing no change in his debtor's position, the
creditor may forbear to press his claim." 1 G. GLENN, supra note 23, at 606.
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serts a claim to the goods.52
Thus common law judges, to alleviate their suspicions about
secret conveyances and to protect reliance creditors, developed the
doctrine that retention of possession by a seller or chattel mortgagor (now, Article 9 debtor) is fraudulent against his creditors, who
therefore may avoid the grant of a nonpossessory interest in the
goods.5" Public notice arguably would ameliorate both aspects of
the nonpossessory lien problem. It would solve the problem of ostensible ownership because the debtor's creditors easily could discover encumbrances on goods in the debtor's possession, and it
would reduce the problem of asserting a sham security interest to
insulate assets from judicial liens. Article 9 builds upon this notion
by establishing the means through which a secured party can publicize his nonpossessory security interest.5 4 It also encourages publicity by imposing a penalty on a secured party who fails to publicize his interest: the security interest, which is enforceable against
the debtor, is ineffective against certain third parties, including
creditors who subsequently acquire rights in the goods and whose
55
rights otherwise would be subordinate to the security interest.
Like the Article 6 buyer in bulk, the Article 9 secured party suffers
this penalty even when the debtor intended no fraud, the failure to
perfect the security interest was the consequence of a good faith
mistake, and no one was misled by the failure to file. 6
52. "The inference is . . .strong . . that the transaction was merely colorable; and
that the parties intended to hold the sale in reserve, to be used against creditors at a convenient season." Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle at 281 (Gibson, J.) (applying seller-inpossession rules to chattel mortgagor in possession).
53. See, e.g., Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812) (sale); Clow v.
Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819) (Gibson, J.) (chattel mortgage).
54. See generally U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-304, 9-305 (methods of giving public notice).
55. Ordinarily, a transferee obtains no better title than his transferor had. See id. § 2403(1) (first sentence); id. § 9-306(2) (security interest continues notwithstanding disposition). These rules exemplify the general principle expressed by the maxim nemo dat quod
non habet (one cannot give what one does not have). Professor Gilmore has sketched the
history of the principle. 1 G. GiLMORE, supra note 30, at 229 n.1. For a thoughtful discussion
of the interaction of this "security of property" or "derivation" principle, and its opposite,
the "good-faith-purchase" principle, see Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyancing
Principlesand Property Interests,59 B.U.L. REv. 811 (1979). Failure to give prompt public
notice may result in subordination of the security interest to a subsequent, competing claim.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (lien creditor, buyer, and transferee); id. § 9-312(5) (secured
party); id. § 9-313(4)(b) (owner or encumbrancer of real estate); 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a)(1), 547
(1982 & Supp. II 1984) (bankruptcy trustee). But a security interest no longer is invalid or
fraudulent by reason of liberty in the debtor to use or dispose of the collateral or its proceeds. U.C.C. § 9-205 (repealing, inter alia, Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925)).
56. See, e.g., In re Smith, 326 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Minn. 1971) (finance company's perfected security interest takes priority over bank's prior, unperfected security interest of
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In many significant respects, then, Article 9 is similar to Article 6. Each article addresses a fraud on creditors that may arise
from a conveyance of personal property; each article puts the burden of preventing the transferor's fraud on the transferee; and
each article assumes that providing notice of the transfer to the
parties likely to be affected will have a salutary effect. In the case
of Article 6, those parties are the existing creditors of the transferor, who are entitled to direct notice. Article 9 protects as well
potential creditors of the transferor by establishing a system of
constructive notice. Each article imposes adverse consequences on
the noncomplying transferee even when he purchases in good faith
and for value and even when no fraud is committed. Each imposes
a similar penalty by enabling creditors of the transferor to acquire
rights superior to those of the transferee, contrary to basic legal
principles. Article 6 permits creditors of A to reach B's property,
and Article 9 permits a transferee of the collateral to acquire better title than his transferor, the debtor, had.5 7
Although conceptually they are quite similar, the notice requirements of Article 6 and 9 address different frauds. Article 6
reduces the bulk sales risk that the debtor will dispose of his assets
and abscond with the proceeds. Article 9 solves the problems associated with nonpossessory, consensual liens by preventing a debtor
from misleading his creditors about the state of his assets and by
discouraging a debtor from using a sham secured transaction to insulate his assets from his creditors.58 From time to time situations
arise that require notice under both articles. The following discussion examines these situations and suggests the legal consequences
which finance company had actual knowledge). Compare U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1962 official
text) with id. § 9-301(1)(b) (1972 official text) (latter version deletes requirement that creditor acquire lien "without knowledge of the [unperfected] security interest" in order to take
priority).

57. In one sense, the latter consequence is a variation of the former; for example, a
lien creditor of the debtor can reach a secured party's property (his unperfected security
interest) to satisfy the debtor's obligation.
58. Nonpossessory interests in personal property are now common, so that the historical notion that an unpublicized security interest is presumptively deceptive or fraudulent

lacks whatever force it once may have had. See supra note 49. But cf. Phillips, The Commercial CulpabilityScale, 92 YALz L.J. 228, 248-51 (1982) (the first-to-file-or-perfect prior-

ity rule reflects the historical view that the failure to file a financing statement constitutes
conduct intended to cause others to rely to their detriment). Regardless of the effect it may
have on reducing fraud, the public notice requirement enables subsequent potential claimants to rely on the absence of public notice of a security interest as an indication that particular personal property is not so encumbered. In that way, the requirement reduces the
cost of acquiring information. See Baird & Jackson, Possessionand Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 179-90 (1983).
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that should follow when both notices are properly given, when
neither is given, and when only one is given.
III.

THE RIGHTS OF A SECURED PARTY WHOSE COLLATERAL IS SOLD
IN BULK AGAINST A BUYER IN BULK

This part considers the relative rights of a secured party
whose collateral is sold in bulk and a buyer of the collateral. It
shows that whether the buyer in bulk takes the goods free of the
security interest or subject to it may depend on whether the secured party is perfected and whether the buyer in bulk complies
with Article 6. I will assume throughout that a secured party has a
valid security interest in the existing and after-acquired inventory5 9 of a retailer, 0 that the retailer sold the entire inventory to a
buyer6 l who purchased in good faith and for adequate consideration, 2 and that the retailer disposed of the proceeds.6 3
A.
1.

The Rights of a Perfected Secured Party
Against a Noncomplying Buyer in Bulk

Assume first that the secured party has perfected its security
interest properly by filing a financing statement in the appropriate
office 64 and that the buyer has failed to comply with any of his
59. "A 'bulk transfer' is any transfer in bulk and not in the ordinary course of the
transferor's business of a major part of the . . . inventory ... of an enterprise subject to
this Article [6]." U.C.C. § 6-102(1). In addition, "[a] transfer of a substantial part of the
equipment ...
is a bulk transfer if it is made in connection with a bulk transfer of inventory, but not otherwise." Id. § 6-102(2). Because the transfer of inventory gives rise to most
bulk transfer problems, I have devoted the text of this Article to issues that arise from
inventory transfers. Discussion of problems peculiar to the transfer of equipment is in the
footnotes.
60. "The enterprises subject to this Article [6] are all those whose principal business is
the sale of merchandise from stock, including those who manufacture what they sell." Id.
§ 6-102(3). Although retailers are not the only transferors in bulk who are subject to Article
6, they are typical of that class and are used by way of example. But see infra notes 155-56
and accompanying text.
61. Although a transfer of a "major part" of the inventory implicates Article 6, in
order to simplify the analysis I have assumed that all the inventory was transferred. A "major part" is more than half. See, e.g., Wikelund Wholesale Co. v. Tile World Factory Tile
Warehouse, 57 Ill. App. 3d 269, 271-72, 372 N.E.2d 1022, 1023 (1978).
62. Fraudulent conveyance law immunizes transferees who act in good faith and give
adequate consideration. See supra note 27. Accordingly, the effects of Article 6 are seen
more clearly when the article is applied to transferees of that kind.
63. A security interest continues in any identifiable proceeds of a sale of collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-306(2). The secured party's recovery of the proceeds would reduce the debt secured by the original collateral but not affect the analysis otherwise.
64. To determine the appropriate office(s) in which to file, see id. § 9-103 (designating
the state whose law governs perfection) and id. § 9-401(1) (setting forth the appropriate
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duties under Article 6. Not surprisingly, both Article 9 and Article
6 support the view that the perfected secured party prevails over
the noncomplying buyer.
Article 9 suggests that the buyer takes the goods subject to the
security interest. The security agreement (which grants the security interest) is "effective according to its terms . . . against pur-

chasers of the collateral.""8 Indeed, except when Article 9 "otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral
notwithstanding [an unauthorized] sale.""6 The principal exception
that enables a buyer of inventory to take free of a perfected security interest is section 9-307(1), which protects buyers in ordinary
course of business.6 7 The Code specifically excludes from that favored category our buyer, who bought in bulk."" Accordingly, the
perfected security interest is enforceable against him. 9 This result
comports with the policy of Article 9. By filing, the secured party
has prevented any problem of the debtor's ostensible ownership.
place to file within a state). Section 9-402 sets forth the formal requisites of the financing
statement.
65. Id. § 9-201. A buyer is a "purchaser." See id. § 1-201(33), (32).
66. Id. § 9-306(2). This rule is a particular application of the first sentence of § 2403(1).
67. Notwithstanding § 2-402(3), which provides that nothing in Article 2 shall be
deemed to impair the rights of creditors of the seller under Article 9, some courts have
relied on § 2-403(2) (a merchant to whom goods have been entrusted has the power to transfer the entruster's rights to a buyer in ordinary course) as an alternative to § 9-307(1) when
enabling a buyer in ordinary course of business to take free of a perfected security interest.
See, e.g., Makransky v. Long Island Reo Truck Co., 58 Misc. 2d 338, 295 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup.
Ct. 1968). Contra National Shawmut Bank v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386, 389, 236 A.2d 484, 486
(1967). If the security interest is perfected through a warehouse receipt, see U.C.C. § 9304(2), (3), the inventory is fungible, and the warehouse is also in the business of buying
and selling goods of that kind, then the security interest can be lost to a buyer in ordinary
course from the warehouse. Id. § 7-205; cf. id. §§ 7-502, 7-503 (a perfected security interest
in goods may be lost to a holder to whom a negotiable document of title covering the goods
has been duly negotiated). Although certain buyers of other types of collateral may take free
from perfected security interests, see, e.g., id. § 9-307(2) (consumer goods); id. § 9-308 (chattel paper and instruments); id. § 9-309 (negotiable instruments, negotiable documents, and
securities), buyers of equipment do not. Regarding authorized sales, see infra notes 88-95
and accompanying text.
68. "'Buying' . . . does not include a transfer in bulk." U.C.C. § 1-201(9); see also
infra note 116.
69. "[S]ince the transferee takes subject to the security interest, the secured party
may repossess the collateral from him or in an appropriate case maintain an action for conversion." U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 3. For discussions of the secured party's rights against a
transferee of the collateral, see Nickles, Enforcing Article 9 Security Interests Against
Subordinate Buyers of Collateral,50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 511 (1982); Wechsler, Rights and
Remedies of the Secured PartyAfter an Unauthorized Transfer of Collateral:A Proposal
for Balancing Competing Claims in Repossession, Resale, Proceeds, and Conversion Cases,
32 BUFF. L. REv. 373 (1983); infra notes 174-251 and accompanying text.
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The buyer easily could have discovered the security interest by
checking the public records. He then could have either refused to
consummate the transaction or discharged the security interest by
applying the sale proceeds to the secured party's claim.
Article 6 gives the same sensible result. Failure to comply with
Article 6, for example, by not notifying the seller's creditors that
the sale will occur, renders the sale "ineffective against any creditor" of the seller,7 0 including secured creditors. 71 Because the sale
is ineffective against the secured party, the secured party may enforce its perfected security interest against the buyer. This result is
to be expected. Article 6 imposes a penalty upon buyers in bulk
who fail to discharge their duty to advise creditors of a potential
fraud. That penalty deprives a noncomplying buyer of rights he
ordinarily would acquire. One would be surprised if Article 6 enabled a noncomplying buyer to take free of the security interest and
acquire better rights than his transferor had.
2.

Against a Complying Buyer in Bulk

Are the perfected secured party's rights adversely affected
when the buyer in bulk complies with Article 6? Presumably the
secured party received notice of the impending bulk sale.72 If it
fails to act before the buyer pays for the inventory and takes possession, has the secured party lost its collateral to the buyer? A
73
recent case from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, In re McBee,
suggests repeatedly in dictum an affirmative answer: "Secured
creditors of the transferor cannot assert any claims against the
transferee or his property after a complying bulk transfer; the
transferee will not 'pay twice' for property thus freed from prior
security interests. ' 74 The following analysis suggests that the
70. U.C.C. §§ 6-104(1), 6-105. Pre-Code bulk sales laws did not use the term "ineffective." Rather, they used a variety of fraudulent conveyance terms:
void, fraudulent and void, presumed to be fraudulent and void, conclusively presumed
to be fraudulent and void, conclusively presumed to be fraudulent, presumed to be
fraudulent, voidable, prima facie be presumed to be fraudulent and void, presumed to
be fraudulent and therefore void, and shall be held to be prima facie void.
Miller, supra note 17, at 274-75 (footnotes omitted).
71. See, e.g., Automatic Truck & Trailer Wash Centers, Inc. v. Eastamp, Inc., 320 So.
2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); U.C.C. § 1-201(12) (definition of "creditor").
72. Even if the buyer complies with Article 6, the secured party may not receive notice. The seller may have omitted the secured party from the list of creditors, or the secured
party may not have received the notice that the buyer sent. See infra text following note 91.
73. National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316
(5th Cir. 1983).
74. Id. at 1326; see also id. at 1319 (security interest was retained "by virtue of the

1986]

ARTICLES 6 AND 9

court's view is incorrect. Under both Article 9 and Article 6, a perfected security interest survives a complying bulk sale.
The applicable Article 9 rule is clear: a security interest generally continues in the collateral notwithstanding that the collateral
is sold.7 5 Unfortunately, the McBee court ignores the statute and
asserts the opposite: "In the absence of a bulk sales law, creditors
generally would lose all security interest in collateral on transfer to
a new owner . .
,"'Thecourt supports its position by citing to
Professors White and Summers, who state that "[i]n the absence
of a bulk sales law a transferor's creditors are generally not entitled to levy or the like on assets the transferor has sold to a new
owner. ' '"" The court, however, neglects to consider this statement
in the context in which it appears. Throughout their discussion of
bulk sales, White and Summers focus on the rights of unsecured
trade creditors.78 The statement on which the court relies is no
more than a restatement of the basic rule that B's property is not
liable for A's debts.7 9 A different principle governs transfers of
goods subject to security interests: a purchaser acquires no greater
rights than his transferor had.8 0 White and Summers recognize the
crucial distinction between secured and unsecured creditors. In the
introduction to their discussion, the authors make clear that a
transferor's creditors "might protect themselves by taking security
interests in the merchandise they supply, for such security would
be good even against a transferee of the business who bought in
good faith and for fair value."8 1 They go on to suggest that widespread use of security interests would obviate the need for a bulk
82
sales law.
In short, the Fifth Circuit panel misapprehends the general
non-complying bulk transfer"), 1327-28 (had transferee complied with Article 6, secured
parties would have retained no interest).
75. U.C.C. § 9-306(2). The rule is subject to exceptions, none of which applies to the
case under consideration. See infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
76. In re McBee, 714 F.2d at 1316.
77. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 768.
78. Id. ch. 19 passim.
79. See supra note 21.
80. See supra note 55.
81. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 757. Insofar as it contemplates unperfected secured parties, this statement may be too broad. See infra notes 103-73 and accompanying text.
82. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 757. Professor Hawkland believes that a
perfected secured party "may actually be in a stronger position after the bulk transfer than
he was previously," inasmuch as "the secured party acquires an interest in the proceeds
generated by the transfer in addition to retaining an interest in the transferred goods themselves." 6 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 43, § 6-104:11, Art. 6 at 81-82.
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rule that the sale of collateral does not terminate a perfected security interest. Although there are two exceptions to this rule,
neither necessarily applies to a bulk sale. The first exception enables a buyer of inventory in ordinary course to take free of a security interest created by his seller.8 By definition, a buyer in bulk
does not buy in ordinary course8 4 and so is not entitled to take free
of a perfected security interest. Nor does a buyer in bulk deserve
the special treatment the Code affords to the buyer in ordinary
course. Allowing a buyer to cut off a perfected security interest in
the inventory of his seller frees the buyer from the cost and delay
attendant to an investigation into the state of the seller's title to
the goods. Imposing on the buyer the risk that the seller is financing his inventory seems far less appropriate in an ordinary course
transaction than in a bulk sale. Even without a title investigation,
a bulk sale typically requires considerably more time and expense
to negotiate, document, and consummate. Moreover, the buyer in
ordinary course has every reason to believe that a secured party
would authorize the sale to him. The creditor who is secured by
goods that the debtor is in the business of selling has the expectation, or at least the hope, that the debtor will sell the goods in
ordinary course because those sales enable the debtor to continue
in business and repay his debt. One would look askance at a secured party that objected to ordinary course sales or that effectively prevented them by refusing to release its security interest.
Accordingly, the Code generally precludes a secured party from
these actions. 85 One cannot safely presume that a secured party
would relinquish its security interest to facilitate a bulk sale, in
which all the collateral may be removed from the debtor's possession at once and the debtor left holding relatively small proceeds
with which to pay the secured debt.86 Consequently, Article 9 does
83. U.C.C. § 9-307(1). Presale notice to the secured party is irrelevant to the operation
of this section.
84. Id. § 1-201(9) (definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business"); id. § 6-102(1)
(definition of "bulk transfer"); see also infra note 116.
85. A buyer of farm products in ordinary course of business is excepted from the general rule and does not take free of a security interest created by his seller. U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
But see Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1324, 99 Stat. 1535-40 (to be
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1631) (effective Dec. 23, 1985) (governing the rights of buyers of farm
products in ordinary course and superseding state law to the contrary). A buyer who actually knows that the secured party has prohibited the sale to him or that the sale otherwise
would violate the security interest cannot be a buyer in ordinary course of business, id. § 1201(9), and takes subject to the security interest, id. § 9-306(2).
86. See Nickles, Rethinking Some U.C.C. Article 9 Problems, 34 ARK. L. Rxv. 1, 119
n.689 (1980). See generally, e.g., United States v. Handy & Harman, 750 F.2d 777, 781 (9th
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not deprive a secured creditor of his perfected security interest
87
when the collateral is sold in bulk.
A second exception to the general rule that a security interest
in inventory continues notwithstanding sale of the collateral occurs
when the secured party, "in the security agreement or otherwise,"
authorizes the disposition."" Courts have interpreted "otherwise"
to include cases in which the secured party implietily authorizes a
sale or in some manner waives its security interest.8 9 The unstated
premise for the McBee court's view that a complying buyer in bulk
takes free of a perfected security interest may be the court's belief
that, by failing to assert its security interest in the face of a bulk
sale notice, the secured party "otherwise" authorizes the sale. Even
if the premise is correct, 90 it does not support the court's blanket
rule.
Waiver and implied authorization depend on the secured
Cir. 1984); Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 946, 952 (D.N.J.
1981); First Sec. Bank v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 856, 664 P.2d 281, 284 (Ct.
App. 1983) (security agreements permitted only sales in ordinary course of business).
87. For suggestions that the rule in § 9-307(1) may be economically efficient, see
A. SCHWARTZ & R. SCOTT, supra note 31, at 601-02 (secured parties appear capable of bearing risk of unauthorized sales by debtors at lower cost than most buyers); Baird & Jackson,
supra note 58, at 210 (§ 9-307(1) may replicate agreement that secured party and buyer in
ordinary course would reach in face-to-face bargaining).
88. U.C.C. § 9-306(2). To the extent that one considers the rule of § 9-307(1) to be
premised upon the secured party's implied authorization of ordinary course sales, that rule
may be considered a particular application of the rule in § 9-306(2) regarding authorized
dispositions. Pre-Code law used the theory of implied authorization to protect ordinary
course buyers. See Nickles, supra note 86, at 119-125.
89. See, e.g., State Bank, Palmer v. Scoular-Bishop Grain Co., 217 Neb. 379, 349
N.W.2d 912 (1984) ("or otherwise" includes implied consent, waiver, or ratification by
course of dealing); see also Muir v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 108 N.J. Super. 586, 262 A.2d 33
(1970) (secured party estopped from asserting perfected security interest). Most of the cases
finding an implied authorization of the sale or a waiver of the security interest concern
buyers of farm products in ordinary course. Those buyers would take free of the security
interest had they bought inventory rather than farm products. U.C.C. § 9-307(1). The cases
on authorized sales are far from uniform in their reasoning and results. For a discussion of
cases and policies in the agricultural setting, see B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SEcURED TRANGACTioNS
8.4[3] (1980 & Cum. Supp. No. 1 1985).
90. Whether a disposition has been "authorized" within the meaning of § 9-306(2) is a
question of fact. See, e.g., Five Points Bank v. Scoular-Bishop Grain Co., 217 Neb. 677, 350
N.W.2d 549 (1984). Some cases hold that a secured party who knows of an impending sale,
but does not object, does not necessarily authorize it. See, e.g., Central Cal. Equip. Co. v.
Dolk Tractor Co., 78 Cal. App. 3d 855, 144 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (mere acquiescence is not authorization when security agreement prohibits disposition without secured
party's written consent); Matto's, Inc. v. Olde Colonie Place (In re Matto's, Inc.), 8 Bankr.
485 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981) (secured party consented to sale but did not authorize transfer free of security interest). But see, e.g., In re Vieths, Inc., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
943 (Ref. E.D. Wis. 1971).
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party's acquiescence in the bulk transfer, which in turn depends on
the secured party's knowledge of the transfer.9 1 Even the buyer's
complete compliance with Article 6 does not insure that the secured party will learn of the sale before it occurs. For example, the
buyer may never send notice to the secured party because the
seller may omit the secured party from the list of creditors that he
'2
prepares. Unless the buyer is "shown to have had knowledge,"
which means "actual knowledge,"' 3 the omission does not render
the transfer ineffective. Notice need be sent only to creditors on
the list and "to all other persons who are known [again, by actual
knowledge] to the transferee to hold or assert claims against the
transferor. ' 94 Moreover, the buyer meets his statutory obligations
by mailing the notice, even if for some reason the secured party
never receives it."5 Thus, to the extent that the McBee court's notion that a complying bulk transfer ipso facto terminates a perfected security interest is based on a theory of implied authorization or waiver, the notion is without foundation.
Not only does the Fifth Circuit panel misapprehend the nature of the security interest, it also misunderstands the purpose of
Article 6. The court errs in its belief that Article 6 must be read to
"protect the transferee and his subsequent creditors by bringing to
light and terminating all prior security claims to the transferred
property."9 Like its predecessors, Article 6 was enacted to protect
the seller's creditors from fraud, not a buyer in bulk from otherwise valid claims to the goods.9 7 The buyer's protection arises from
91. See, e.g., First Sec. Bank v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 856, 664 P.2d
281, 284 (Ct. App. 1983); Citizens Say. Bank v. Sac City State Bank, 315 N.W.2d 20, 26
(Iowa 1982) (no implied authorization by secured party that lacked prior knowledge of bulk
sale of collateral); State Bank, Palmer v. Scoular-Bishop Grain Co., 217 Neb. 379, 387, 349
N.W.2d 912, 917 (1984).
92. U.C.C. § 6-104(3).
93. Id. § 1-201(25).
94. Id. § 6-107(3).
95. Section 6-107(3) requires that the notice be "delivered personally or sent." Compare id. § 1-201(38) (definition of "send") with id. § 1-201(26) (when person "receives" a
notice).
96. In re McBee, 714 F.2d 1316, 1327. A badly drawn default clause may prevent a
secured party from foreclosing on collateral and terminating its security interest upon receiving notice of an impending bulk transfer. Even so, the secured party may notify the
buyer that the security interest exists. Notification presumably would negate any authorization that might be inferred from the secured party's silence.
97. Bulk sales laws do afford some benefits to buyers, however. A bulk buyer who
complies with the statute no longer is the transferee of a presumptively fraudulent transfer.
Cf. Walbrun v. Babbitt, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 577, 581 (1872) (bulk sale was prima facie evidence of fraud). Rather, the creditors who think a complying bulk sale is fraudulent must
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Article 9.9 8 Perfected secured parties already have publicized their
interest by filing; notice of an impending bulk sale is not necessary
to bring their claims to light. Finally, Article 6 does not purport to
enable a complying buyer to acquire better title than the seller
had. Rather, it imposes a penalty for noncompliance with its requirements: the transfer is "ineffective," so that the buyer takes
the goods subject to potential claims that a sale to him ordinarily
would cut off. By complying with Article 6, a buyer does no more
than avoid the penalty. He acquires those rights, but only those
rights, that a purchaser of goods subject to a security interest ordinarily acquires: "all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer."99 Occasionally, a good faith purchaser of goods may obtain better title than his transferor had, but these occasions are
few, and the relevant statutory provisions address that issue
clearly. 100 Nothing in Article 6 grants the seller the power to convey greater title than he has, and nothing in Article 6 awards the
buyer better title than that of the seller. Although compliance with
its notice requirements may "permit[ ] the creditors to protect
their security interests before the transfer,"' 1 1 Article 6 does not
prescribe the consequences of the creditors' failure to do so. Any
consequences of the secured party's failure to assert its security
interest against a complying buyer would be found in Article 9,102
and Article 9 does not justify the McBee court's blanket rule. As
with the noncomplying buyer, each article compels a result that is
consistent not only with its purposes but also with the result compelled by the other article.
prove the fraud. Although they may be assisted in this task by receiving advance notice of
the sale, see U.C.C. § 6-101 comment 3, the fact of the buyer's compliance may inure to his

benefit, see supra note 47.
98. Regarding protection of the buyer's creditors, see infra notes 174-226, 229-31 and
accompanying text.
99. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (first sentence); see also id. § 9-201 (security agreement is effective according to its terms against purchasers); id. § 9-306(2) (security interest continues
notwithstanding sale of collateral).
100. E.g., id. § 2-403(1) (second and third sentences) (person with voidable title can
give good title); id. § 2-403(2) (merchant to whom goods are entrusted can transfer entruster's rights); id. § 9-307(1) (buyer of inventory in ordinary course takes free of certain
security interests).
101.

In re McBee, 714 F.2d 1316, 1327 (emphasis changed).

102. General principles of law and equity supplement Article 9's provisions. See
U.C.C. § 1-103.
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The Rights of an Unperfected Secured Party
1. Against a Complying Buyer in Bulk

The preceding part shows that the rights of a perfected secured party against a buyer in bulk, whether complying or noncomplying, are governed by the general principle that a transferee
of goods acquires no greater rights than his transferor had. The
Code contains exceptions to this rule, some of which are found in
Article 9. Among those exceptions is section 9-301(1)(c), which
provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) . . . an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of
(c) in the case of goods... a person who is not a secured party and who
is a transferee in bulk or other buyer not in ordinary course of business ....
to the extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the collateral with103
out knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected.

This section enables a buyer in bulk, in particular cases, to
take goods free of valid security interests and thereby acquire
greater rights than the seller had. It protects those buyers who
concluded from the seller's possession of the goods and the absence
of a filed financing statement that the seller owned the goods free
and clear and who are likely to have acted in reliance on that conclusion to their detriment. A buyer who actually knows of the security interest will not rely to his detriment and so will not take
free of the security interest. Similarly, one who has not given value
is not likely to be injured if the goods he receives are encumbered.1 0 4 Moreover, a buyer who fails to take delivery of goods in
which he has an interest has himself created problems analogous to
those caused by nonpossessory liens. 10 5 Section 9-301(1)(c) pro103. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c).
104. Ordinarily, the donee can return the goods to the encumbrancer; however, if return of the goods is not possible, or if their value has depreciated, the donee may be personally liable for conversion. The value requirement has been in all UCC drafts of § 9-301(1)(c)
since it was added for clarification in 1956. 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board
for the Uniform Commercial Code 273-74, reprintedin 18 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 17, at
297-98. The value requirement was contained in early drafts, see, e.g., U.C.C. § 8-302(1)(a)
(Sept. 1949 rev.), reprintedin 8 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 17, at 322, but concern with the
delivery requirement, see infra note 106, apparently resulted in the inadvertent omission of
the value requirement in a few drafts, see U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c) & comment 2(c) (proposed
final draft, spring 1950), reprinted in 11 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 17, at 247, 249.
105. See generally supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text. Pre-Code law sought to
reduce the frequency of these problems by treating as fraudulent the failure of the buyer to
take possession of goods that he contracted to buy. See generally 1 G. GLENN, supra note 23,
ch. XIX. The Code follows suit. It permits a creditor of the seller to treat a sale or identification of goods to a contract for sale as void if as against the creditor a retention of posses-

1986]

ARTICLES 6 AND 9

203

vides, in essence, that the first party who solves those problems by
giving public notice of his interest will take priority. 06 Thus if the
secured party perfects first, then it will prevail. By taking delivery
first, the buyer will cut off the secured party's rights, even if the
buyer did not rely on the absence of a filing by the secured party
and even if the secured party's failure to perfect its interest was
10 7
neither fraudulent nor negligent.
Article 6 does not affect this result. When the buyer in bulk
complies with the notice provisons, the statutory penalty of making the transfer ineffective does not arise. The buyer acquires those
rights awarded him by other Code provisions; in this case, he acquires superior rights to the inventory by virtue of section 9-

301(1)(c). 0 8

2.

Against a Noncomplying Buyer in Bulk

At first reading, section 9-301(1)(c) appears to enable a buyer
in bulk to take free of an unperfected security interest whether or
not the buyer complies with the notice requirements of Article 6.
After all, section 9-301(1)(c) refers to a "transferee in bulk" without any qualifications. A number of commentaries on the Code
sion by the seller is fraudulent under any rule of law of the state where the goods are situated. U.C.C. § 2-402(2). The Code deems certain commercially reasonable retentions of
possession not fraudulent, notwithstanding non-Code law to the contrary. Id.
106. An early Code draft gave priority to a buyer to the extent he either received
delivery of the collateral or paid all or part of the purchase price before he received knowledge of the unperfected security interest. U.C.C. § 8-301(1)(c) (Oct. 1949 rev.), reprinted in
8 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 17, at 500. The reporters noted that the section conflicted with
the then existing § 2-405 (since rewritten and renumbered as § 2-402). Old § 2-405 protected
a buyer who bought goods that a seller previously had sold to another buyer who left the
seller in possession, only if the second buyer took delivery of the goods. The reporters believed that the Article 2 policy was desirable and that "there would seem to be no reason to
prefer a buyer who fails to protect himself by taking delivery over a secured lender who fails
to protect himself by filing." Unif. Commercial Code 93 (Oct. 1949 rev.) (note to § 8-301),
reprinted in 8 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 17, at 501. The published draft immediately following resolved the perceived conflict by granting priority to a buyer "to the extent he receives delivery of the collateral before he receives knowledge of the security interest and
before it is perfected." U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c) (Mar. 1, 1950 text only printing), reprinted in 9
U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 17, at 154; see also Unif. Commercial Code 757 (spring 1950 proposed final draft) (explaining purpose of change), reprintedin 11 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note
17, at 249.
107. To this extent, the rule may be said to impose a penalty on the secured party.
108. Section 9-301(1)(c) does not by its terms enable a buyer to "take[ ] free" of a
security interest, but rather only "subordinate[s]" the security interest. Compare U.C.C.
§ 9-307(1) with id. § 9-301(1)(c). In the context of § 9-301(1)(c), subordination should be
read as termination. See Carlson, Deathand Subordination Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Senior Buyers and Senior Lien Creditors,5 CARnozo L. REv. 547, 547-63
(1984).
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contain general statements that are consistent with that result;10 9
however, the one case that confronts the issue, National Bank of
Royal Oak v. Frydlewicz," resolves the priorities issue the other
way. Frydlewicz is characterized by weak analysis and confusing
discussion. Nevertheless, I prefer its rule, under which an unperfected security interest survives a noncomplying bulk sale. Subpart (a) analyzes Frydlewicz and disposes of the tortured reading
of the Code and the erroneous premises on which the opinion is
based. The analysis provides useful background to subpart (b), in
which I offer what I believe to be a proper reading of the Code and
sound arguments that support the Frydlewicz result. In subpart
(c), I suggest that the Frydlewicz result not only is consistent with
the Code's design but also may have the desirable effect of minimizing costs.
(a) The Frydlewicz Opinion
In Frydlewicz, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed a
money judgment in favor of an unperfected secured party against a
buyer in bulk that failed to request a list of the seller's creditors.
After stating that "[n]ormally, as a transferee in bulk, [the buyer]
would be entitled to priority over plaintiff's unperfected security
interest,"' and citing section 9-301(1)(c), the court made the following pronouncement, for which it offered no authority: "However, [the buyer] failed to satisfy the requirements necessary under
the bulk transfer provisions of UCC, art 6, to assert a claim of priority as a transferee in bulk.""" Apparently, the court thought that
although the buyer "was, as the trial court held, a transferee in
bulk,""' 3 it nevertheless was not a "transferee in bulk" for purposes of section 9-301(1)(c), and consequently took the inventory
subject to the security interest. Asserting that "[b]ut for the bulk
sales law plaintiff [an unperfected secured party] might be without
remedy, 1" 4 the court grounded its ruling on its belief that the interaction of Articles 9 and 6 "require[s] that plaintiff be protected
109. The commentators generally do not distinguish between complying and noncomplying transferees for purposes of § 9-301(1)(c). See, e.g., 6 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 43
§ 6-106:05, Art. 6 at 104; id. § 6-104:05, Art. 6 at 6-7 (Supp. 1985); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 8, at 1071.
110. 67 Mich. App. 417, 241 N.W.2d 471 (1976).
111. Id. at 421, 241 N.W.2d at 473.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 422, 241 N.W.2d at 473.
114. Id. at 423, 241 N.W.2d at 474.
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against loss of collateral by the coverage of the bulk transfer notice
'115
provisions.
Although the court reaches the proper result, the Frydlewicz
opinion is unpersuasive both in its statutory construction and in
its underlying premises. The court's interpretation of section 9301(1)(c) is particularly troublesome. Its notion that a noncomplying transferee in bulk is a "transferee" of a bulk transfer for purposes of Article 6, but is not a section 9-301(1)(c) "transferee in
bulk," is unsupported by the statutory language. Indeed, even if
the court's reading were correct, section 9-301(1)(c) would protect
a noncomplying buyer in bulk as an "other buyer not in ordinary

course of business. "116
One might attempt to support the court's construction of section 9-301(1)(c) by arguing that the section was designed to protect
only those buyers that justifiably rely on the seller's possession of
the inventory and their own lack of notice of the secured party's
interest as evidence of the seller's clear title. Having neglected to
provide the unperfected secured party the opportunity to bring its
interest to the buyer's attention, the noncomplying buyer in bulk
cannot be said to be without notice of the security interest and
thus ought not be treated as a reliance party. This attempt fails for
at least two reasons. First, section 9-301(1) does not randomly impose knowledge or notice requirements on competing claimants.
Rather it distinguishes between, on the one hand, lien creditors,
for whom knowledge is irrelevant, and, on the other hand, transferees (of accounts and general intangibles) and buyers (of other collateral), for whom knowledge affects priority. 117 The Code defines
the term "knowledge," which it distinguishes from "notice." 1 8 Judicial expansion of the term "knowledge" beyond its defined meaning would be inappropriate, especially if the term were construed
to include a kind of inquiry notice that is entirely foreign to the
115. Id. at 424, 241 N.W.2d at 474.
116. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c). One might argue that a buyer in bulk is never an "other
buyer" under § 9-301(1)(c), inasmuch as § 1-201(9) provides that "buying" does not include
a transfer in bulk. A better reading is that the explanation of "buying" in § 1-201(9) applies
only to the definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business," of which the explanation is
a part. In any case, a person prepared to argue that a noncomplying transferee in bulk is not
a "transferee in bulk" for § 9-301(1)(c) purposes, should be prepared to acknowledge that a
noncomplying transfer in bulk is not a "transfer in bulk" for § 1-201(9) purposes, and thus
is not excluded from the definition of "buying."
117. Compare U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (lien creditors) with id. § 9-301(1)(c) (buyers) and
id. § 9-301(1)(d) (transferees).
118. "Notice" includes, but it is not limited to, "knowledge." Id. § 1-201(25).
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Code. 119 There is a second reason for not imposing additional prerequisites for priority under section 9-301(1)(c). When a duty to
discover existing security interests and to warn the secured party
of a competing claim to the collateral is a condition precedent to
obtaining priority, Article 9 explicitly so states. 12 0 Article 9 imposes
no such duty on the buyer in bulk. The only possible source of this
duty for a buyer in bulk is Article 6.
The Frydlewicz court bases its ruling in favor of the unperfected secured party not only on a misguided interpretation of
section 9-301(1)(c), but also on the premise that "[b]ut for the
bulk sales law plaintiff [an unperfected secured party] might be
without remedy."'' This premise is erroneous. Even if the
Frydlewicz rule is rejected and an unperfected security interest is
ineffective against a noncomplying buyer in bulk, the secured party
will not be without a remedy. Rather, the secured party will have
the same remedies that the applicable state law affords other pretransfer creditors12 2 with no property interest in the transferred
goods. Specifically, the secured party will have a right to reach the
goods through levy or other judicial process, or the court may appoint a receiver to take control of the goods for the benefit of all
the creditors. 23 If the buyer in bulk transfers the goods to a good
faith purchaser, the once secured party may have the right to recover money damages from the noncomplying buyer. 24 In other
119. That is, notice that a buyer would have received had he complied with Article 6,
had the seller included the secured party on the list of creditors, had the notice reached the
secured party before the buyer took delivery and gave value, and had the secured party
acted prior to that time.
120. Section 9-312(3) requires, as a condition of obtaining priority, that a purchase
money secured party give written notification to the holder of a conflicting security interest
in inventory. Section 9-114 contains a similar rule for consigned goods.
121. 67 Mich. App. at 423, 241 N.W.2d at 474.
122. See U.C.C. § 6-109 (explaining which creditors are protected by Article 6).
123. See id. § 6-104 comment 2; id. § 6-111 comment 2. For discussions of creditors'
rights following a noncomplying bulk transfer, see, e.g., 6 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 43,
§§ 6-104:09, :11; J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 8,§§ 19-5, 19-7. In Frydlewicz the
secured party and other creditors also may have been able to avoid the transfer as a fraudulent conveyance. See 67 Mich. App. at 423, 424, 241 N.W.2d at 474 (transfer made at less
than wholesale cost; seller declared bankruptcy within the year); MICH.ComP. LAws § 566.14
(1970) (U.F.C.A. § 4 (1919)); Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 67d, 11 U.S.C. § 107d (1976)
(repealed).
124. See U.C.C. § 6-110 (rights of transferees of bulk buyer); id. § 6-106 (optional
section imposing duty on buyer to apply consideration to payment of seller's debts); supra
note 43; infra note 162. For a comparison of the post-transfer rights of an unperfected secured party whose security interest survives the bulk transfer with those of an unsecured
creditor (including an unperfected secured party whose security interest does not survive
the bulk transfer), see infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
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words, even if it were to lose its Article 9 remedies, an unperfected
secured party whose security interest is cut off by a noncomplying
buyer in bulk would retain the remedies of an aggrieved creditor
under Article 6.125 Indeed, to hold otherwise would place a creditor
that takes security in a worse position than one that does not.
That penalty is wholly inconsistent with the concept of security.
In resolving the competing claims, then, the issue is not
whether to allow or deny all remedy to the unperfected secured
party whose collateral is sold to a noncomplying buyer in bulk. Regardless of which result obtains, the unperfected secured party will
have some remedy in addition to an action against the seller. The
real issue is whether the unperfected secured party may enforce its
security interest or whether it must look only to its Article 6 remedies. Frydlewicz holds that the security interest is not lost, and the
following discussion explains my agreement with that result.
(b) A More Appropriate Code Analysis
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, Frydlewicz reaches a result
that is consistent with both the language of the Code and the policies of Articles 6 and 9. Although the Frydlewicz court fails to realize it, section 9-301(1)(c) does lead the careful reader to the desired result without the need for redefining terms. The section
provides that an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the
rights of a transferee in bulk, not simply that the transferee always
takes priority. To determine the extent of those rights, one must
refer to Articles 2 and 6.
Normally, a buyer of goods acquires the rights of his transferor; 1 6 however, Article 6 penalizes the noncomplying buyer by
making the transfer "ineffective" against creditors of the seller.12 7
Comment 2 to section 6-104 explains that when a transfer is inef125.

Cf. B.

CLARK,

supra note 89, at

6.7[1] n.106,

10.5[l] n.104 (a perfected secured

party's Article 6 rights are completely independent of its Article 9 rights). A formerly secured party's Article 6 remedies may be lost with the passage of time, see U.C.C. § 6-111

(six-month statute of limitations), or because the bulk buyer's transferees assert superior
claims to the goods. See infra notes 174-251 and accompanying text. Assertion of Article 6
rights by other aggrieved, unsecured creditors of the bulk seller may diminish or eliminate
the formerly secured party's recovery. Inasmuch as one or more of these events might occur,
the secured party "might" be without a remedy, as Frydlewicz suggests, if it loses its security interest upon a noncomplying bulk transfer. But even if the security interest were to
survive the sale, the secured party "might" be without remedy. For example, a competing

claimant might take the goods free of the security interest, see infra notes 233-51 and accompanying text, and the statute of limitations might run.
126. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (first sentence).

127. Id. §§ 6-104(1), 6-105.
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fective, creditors may "disregard the transfer and levy on the goods
as still belonging to the transferor, or a receiver representing them
can take them by whatever procedure the local law provides. '128
Following the comment, the cases suggest that unsecured creditors
may use a variety of judicial remedies to reach the goods in the
hands of the noncomplying buyer. 12 9 The comment's reference to
levy and receivership suggests that it was written with unsecured
creditors in mind, even though the transfer is ineffective against
secured creditors as well. 130 A fair reading of the word "ineffective"
as it applies to secured creditors should yield an analogous result:
the secured creditor may disregard the transfer and treat the goods
as still belonging to the transferor. That is, upon default the secured party may "foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure." " '
By focusing on the rights of the noncomplying buyer in bulk,
the foregoing gives coherent meaning to the precise language of
both Article 6 and Article 9. It is not the only possible reading, and
courts should not use it unless it leads to a sensible result. In my
view, it does.
The priority provisions of section 9-301(1)(c) directly address
the problem of ostensible ownership by enabling a person who is
likely to be misled to his detriment by a secret security interest
(e.g., a buyer in bulk) to take free of a security interest that is not
publicized appropriately, provided that the person who may be
128. Id. § 6-104 comment 2. Comment 2 to § 6-111 suggests that an aggrieved creditor
may use "not only levies of execution proper but also attachment, garnishment, trustee process, receivership, or whatever proceeding, under the state's practice, is used to apply a
debtor's property to payment of his debts."
129. See Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co. v. Johnson, 149 Ga. App. 537, 254 S.E.2d
752, rev'd on other grounds, 244 Ga. 412, 260 S.E.2d 325 (1979) (garnishment); Belber v.
H.S.F., Inc., 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 796 (1961) (receiver); see also, e.g., Anderson & Clayton Co. v.
Earnest, 610 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (denying personal judgment against transferee; suggesting that creditors may levy execution, obtain injunctions, request receiver, or
have transfer set aside).
130. See supra note 71.
131. U.C.C. § 9-501(1). Because transfers made in settlement or realization of security
interests are not subject to Article 6, id. § 6-103(3), enforcement of a security interest ordinarily will not present Article 6 problems. See, e.g., United States v. Gore, 437 F. Supp. 344
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Midland Bean Co. v. Farmers State Bank, 37 Colo. App. 452, 552 P.2d 317
(1976). But see, e.g., Starman v. John E. Wolfe, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 377, 382-83 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973) (the § 6-103(3) exemption applies only when the secured party has the right to foreclose at the time of the bulk transfer, the transfer is made to the secured party and not to a
third party for the benefit of the secured party, and the consideration received for the transfer is used to extinguish the secured debt before being applied to unsecured debts).
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misled does not create an ostensible ownership problem himself." 2
In the case under discussion, the noncomplying buyer in bulk has
solved the ostensible ownership problem by taking delivery of the
goods, and he ordinarily would prevail against the unperfected secured party. But the buyer has run afoul of another set of notice
requirements, those of Article 6. By failing to notify the seller's
creditors of the impending bulk sale, the buyer prevents the
seller's creditor's from protecting themselves before the transfer
and thus subjects himself to the penalty imposed by that article:
creditors of the seller may use what have become the buyer's goods
to satisfy their claims against the seller.
One might respond to this analysis by noting that although
secured parties are entitled to notice of a bulk transfer, Article 6
was enacted to protect unsecured creditors.'3 3 Without an interest
in the debtor's goods, those creditors face the bulk sales risk described in part II above. By taking collateral, a secured party
reduces the bulk sales risk considerably, provided it publicizes its
interest. Article 9, and not Article 6, alerts the secured party to the
need to perfect its security interest, penalizes the secured party
that fails to perfect, and protects the secured party that complies.
Having excluded itself voluntarily from the class of unsecured
creditors, a secured party arguably ought not benefit from legislation designed to protect that class. Moreover, by construing section
9-301(1)(c) to award priority to all buyers in bulk, including noncomplying buyers, one affords unsecured creditors a much greater
opportunity to satisfy their claims from the transferred goods, because those goods will not be encumbered.13 4 Arguably this result
132. See supra note 106.
133. Weintraub & Levin, Bulk Transfers-A FunctionalApproach to Article 6 of the
Code, 1C P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. MCDONNELL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMRCIAL CODE § 22.01 (1985); cf. Billig & Smith, Bulk Sales Laws: A
Study in Code Interpretation,38 W. VA. L.Q. 309, 310 (1932) (referring to pre-Code bulk
sales laws).
134. If a noncomplying buyer in bulk takes free of an unperfected security interest,
the secured party will become unsecured. Any interest it subsequently acquires in the transferred goods, for example, by obtaining a judicial lien, will take priority over the interests
acquired by the other unsecured creditors only if it is the first interest to arise. If, however,
the unperfected security interest survives the sale, the secured party can take priority over
the unsecured creditors with greater ease-by perfecting its security interest before unsecured creditors become lien creditors. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b). In either case, by taking collective action, a group of unsecured creditors may limit the secured party to its pro rata
share of the value of the transferred goods. See, e.g., Murdock v. Plymouth Enter., (In re
Curtina Int'l, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 969 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (bulk seller's trustee in bankruptcy may assert Article 6 rights for the benefit of the estate); 11 U.S.C. §§ 303, 544(b),
547(b), 550 (1982).
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is consistent with Article 6's efforts to protect unsecured creditors.
The foregoing response is inconclusive. First, nothing in Article 6 restricts its application to the rights of unsecured creditors;
on the contrary, sections 6-109 and 1-201(12), as well as the drafting history of Article 6, suggest that Article 6 protects secured
creditors."5 Second, to the extent that a secured party is partially
unsecured-that is, to the extent that the value of the collateral is
less than the debt it secures-the secured party faces the same
bulk sales risk and thus deserves the same Article 6 protection as a
creditor who is completely unsecured. To deny a partially unsecured creditor the protection of Article 6 would create an unjustifiable distinction among similarly situated creditors. On the other
hand, to require that notice be given to undersecured creditors but
not to fully secured creditors would create difficult questions of
valuation and needlessly would undermine the creditors' efforts to
reduce the risk of the debtor's nonpayment. Finally, although historically the perceived plight of unsecured creditors prompted the
enactment of bulk transfer laws, those laws, and their contemporary successor, were intended neither as general relief provisions
135. In its early drafts, the bulk transfer provisions of the Code specifically protected
a wide array of creditors, including secured creditors, notwithstanding that the Code's general definition of "creditor," which derived from early drafts of Article 2, included only unsecured creditors. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (May 1949 draft) (definition of "creditor"),
reprintedin 7 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 17, at 19, with id. § 7-711(1), reprintedin 8 U.C.C.
Drafts 688 (which creditors are protected by bulk transfer provisions). The October 1949
revisions removed the expansive definition of creditors in the bulk sales article, apparently
leaving the narrow Article 1 definition to control. See U.C.C. § 9-109(1) (Oct. 1949 rev.),
reprinted in 8 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 17, at 557. But see Miller, supra note 17, at 280
("Despite the absence of such language in this [1950 proposed final] draft, nothing appears
to limit the breadth of the definition in any way.").
In 1955 the Code's Editorial Board recommended that the Article 1 definition of "creditor" in § 1-201(12) be widened "to include all classes of creditor," including secured creditors. American Law Institute & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Supplement No. 1 to the Official Draft of Text and Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code 4 (1955), reprinted in 17 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 17, at 322. Subsequent
Code drafts all reflected a more inclusive definition. See 18-23 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 17,
passim. The Editorial Board's recommendation may have been made in response to the
actions of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, which cited § 1-201(12) as an
example of a term that was given an "artificial meaning." Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Committee on Uniform State Laws, Report on the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, at 9 (1953), reprintedin 15 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 17, at 307, 317; 8 Rec.
A.B. City N.Y. 56-57 (1953) (reporting Association approval of Committee Report); see also
Weintraub & Levin, supra note 133 (mindful that a secured creditor may have an unsecured
deficiency, the Code includes secured creditors within § 1-201(12) definition of "creditor"
and affords them benefits of bulk transfer statute). The Code's protection of secured parties
in Article 6 does not make a change from prevailing pre-Code bulk sales acts. See Annot., 85
A.L.R.2d 1211, 1238-39 (1962); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1406, 1416, 1418 (1933).
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for unsecured creditors nor as regulation of the relative rights of
secured and unsecured creditors. Their intention is considerably
more modest: to protect aggrieved creditors against a particular
kind of debtor misconduct, the use of a bulk transfer as a means of
avoiding payment. Article 6 attempts to achieve this protection by
granting to the transferor's creditors rights against transferred
goods and, in some cases, against the transferee himself. The rights
of unsecured and secured creditors inter se are set forth clearly in
Article 9. Nothing in Article 6 justifies adjusting them.""8
(c) An Economic Analysis
The preceding subpart suggests a reading of section 9301(1)(c) that protects the unperfected secured party's Article 9
rights at the expense of a noncomplying buyer in bulk and in a
manner consistent with the language of the Code and the policies
of both Article 6 and Article 9. The Code's resolution of these competing claims, however, is not free from ambiguity. Section 9301(1)(c) is susceptible to more than one reading. As a consequence, external norms may be particularly appropriate guides to
allocating the underlying loss when the buyer in bulk has failed to
comply with Article 6 and the secured party has failed to cure an
137
ostensible ownership problem.
One common approach to problems of risk allocation is to impose the risk of loss on the party who can prevent or insure against
the loss at less cost. This allocation usually has two effects. First, it
minimizes the resources spent on loss avoidance, thereby freeing
those resources for alternative uses. Second, because some losses
are likely to exceed one party's cost of avoidance but be less than
the other party's cost, allocating the loss to the efficient cost
avoider is likely to reduce the total number of losses. 3 8
136. The courts have construed optional U.C.C. § 6-106(1) as preserving the secured
party's priority in the proceeds of a bulk transfer and obligating the buyer to distribute
accordingly the consideration he pays for the goods. Huguelet v. M & M Assocs., 375 So. 2d
1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Bomanzi of Lexington, Inc. v. Tafel, 415 S.W.2d 627 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1967) (dictum); William Iselin & Co. v. Delta Auction & Real Estate Co., 433 So.
2d 911 (Miss. 1983) (dictum); cf. In re Clement Bulk Sale, 98 Dauph. 55, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d
717 (1976) (pretransfer judicial lien creditor entitled to priority).
137. The Code contains its own norms. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (Code's underlying purposes and policies). When the Code resolves competing claims unambiguously, as it does, for
example, in the cases discussed supra notes 18-58 and accompanying text, I do not discuss
external norms, such as efficiency, in detail. I do, however, occasionally suggest that efficiency is not inconsistent with the results of my analysis. See, e.g., supra note 87; infra text
accompanying notes 179-82.
138. For general discussions of an efficiency analysis of legal rules, see, e.g.,
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To choose a rule that requires a case-by-case determination of
the efficient cost avoider is both costly and inconsistent with the
Code's approach to loss allocation.'3 9 Accordingly, a general rule
for these cases may be preferable. 140 That rule would impose the

risk of loss on the class of parties-unperfected secured parties or
buyers-that is likely to be able to bear the loss at less cost. Unfortunately, as between secured parties and buyers in bulk, one cannot identify a priori the class of efficient cost avoiders.
The secured party and the buyer in bulk each can prevent the
loss by complying with the notice requirements of Article 9 and
Article 6 respectively. For the secured party, the costs would be
those of perfecting the security interest and keeping it perfected,
probably by filing. 14 1 These costs would include not only the costs

of preparing and filing a financing statement, including the filing
fees, which are usually low,

42

but also the potentially greater costs

N. MERCURO & T. RYAN, LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1984);

R

POSNER, ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 485 (1980). A. SCHWARTZ & R SCOTT, supra note 31, applies efficiency analysis to a
variety of Code rules. When each party has neglected to undertake antifraud measures (Article 9 filing and Article 6 notice), theories of corrective justice are unlikely to assist in
allocating the risk of loss.
139. Costs would include not only litigation expenses (e.g., attorneys' fees, delay, court
costs) but also the costs of uncertainty. Professor David Morris Phillips suggests that when
a loss occurs and no party is culpable, the Code tends to impose the loss according to a
"strict liability" principle. "Such an approach implements a legislative calculation that, in
general, parties within a certain class can more easily avoid loss than can members of the
class to which their adversaries belong .... The doctrine is a probability calculus, not an
inquiry directed to the actual circumstances of the parties." Phillips, supra note 58, at 232.
140. See A. SCHWARTZ & R. ScoTT, supra note 31, at 461. Professor Phillips points out
that courts may not be properly equipped to identify in each case the party that could have
avoided the loss at least cost. Phillips, supra note 58, at 277. He also notes several difficulties inherent in allocating loss according to the class to which the party belongs: the efficiency calculation underlying the rule may be based on an incomplete set of factors; it may
become dated over time; and the rule is less flexible than judgments made on the basis of a
party's intention, knowledge, or negligence. Id. at 232 n..
141. A security interest in goods can be perfected by the secured party's taking possession of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-305. Because inventory and equipment typically are of
greater value when left in the debtor's hands, filing is preferable. A secured party will be
deemed to have possession of goods that are under the control of a field warehouse established at his behest. See id. (second sentence). Under a properly administered field warehouse, the debtor will be able to consummate sales of inventory in ordinary course but not
out of the ordinary course, such as in bulk. Perfection through field warehousing is very
likely to be more costly than perfection through filing. The debtor's need to use equipment
prevents field warehousing from being an effective substitute for the secured party's taking
possession of equipment. See id. § 9-205 (second sentence and comment 6). For a discussion
of the history and uses of field warehousing, see generally Skilton, Field Warehousing as a
FinancingService (pts. 1 & 2), 1961 WIs. L. REv. 221, 403.
142. In very few states, filing fees are supplemented by taxes on secured debt. See,
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of ascertaining the debtor's correct name and location, 143 determining where to file,' 4 4 making multiple filings, 14 5 and monitoring the
debtor to discover changes in the debtor's name and in the location
of collateral. 146 That even sophisticated secured parties periodically are unperfected suggests that the costs of perfection are not
so trivial as they might appear at first blush.
Nevertheless, these costs would seem to be less than the costs
of complying with Article 6. The costs of Article 6 compliance are
numerous. They include the costs of determining that the sale is
subject to Article 6, preparing the notice, distributing the notice to
creditors, preparing the schedule of property transferred, and making available to the seller's creditors the schedule and a sworn list
of the creditors. 47 Disclosure of the fact that the transaction will
occur and the particular details surrounding it may give rise to less
obvious costs. For example, the buyer may lose a competitive advantage if his competitors discover that he is entering into a particular business or learn the cost of his inventory. Once they become aware of the impending change of ownership, the seller's
trade creditors may be reluctant to continue to supply the business, thereby jeopardizing its continued operation. Some states impose upon the buyer the duty to apply the consideration he owes
for the goods to the payment of the seller's debts. 48 Because some
of these debts may be unliquidated, disputed, or entitled to priore.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 277(a), (s) (1980 & Supp. 1984) (tax on "instrument of writing" at the rate of $1.65 for each $500 of the principal amount of debt secured under certain
UCC financing statements). Payment of the taxes may be a prerequisite to perfection. See
American City Bank v. Western Auto Supply Co., 631 S.W.2d 410 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)
(security interest perfected only to extent of tax paid). But see Associates Commercial Corp.
v. Sel-O-Rak Corp., 746 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1984) (construing Florida law) (conditioning

perfection on payment of tax does violence to both the language and purpose of Article 9).
143. See, e.g., In re Raymond F. Sargent, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 583
(Ref. D. Me. 1970) (financing statement showing "Raymond F. Sargent Co., Inc.," as debtor
held ineffective); In re Kalinoski, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 387 (Ref. W.D. Wis.
1973) (debtor located in the small part of Cuba City that is in LaFayette County; postal

directory, official state highway map, and State Blue Book place Cuba City entirely in Grant
County; filing in Grant County held ineffective).
144. See supra note 64.
145. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 9-401(1) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984) (third
alternative subsection (1) to § 9-401).
146. See U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (changes in debtor's name); id. § 9-103 (multiple state
transactions).

147. See id. §§ 6-104, 6-105, 6-107. Either the buyer may preserve the list and schedule for six months and permit the seller's creditors to inspect and copy them at all reasonable hours, or he may file the documents in a designated public office. Id. § 6-104(1)(c).
148. See id. § 6-106. Fewer than half the states have adopted this optional section. See
2A U.L.A. 314 (master ed. 1977); id. at 147-48 (Supp. 1985).
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ity in payment, this task may be formidable. 149
Both the secured party and the buyer in bulk may be able to
prevent the loss by taking steps other than filing or giving a proper
Article 6 notice. The secured party can monitor the debtor to discover an impending bulk sale. Once it discovers that the debtor is
contemplating a bulk sale, the secured party can prevent the buyer
from taking delivery or inform the buyer of the security interest,
thereby preventing the buyer from qualifying for the protection of
section 9-301(1) (c). 150 Similarly, the buyer could undertake to discover whether the goods are encumbered with a security interest.
Presumably, most buyers make some investigation, perhaps by
conducting a search of the UCC filings or by asking the debtor for
financial information, so that they can discover perfected security
interests. Discovery of unperfected security interests may require a
more thorough, and therefore more costly, investigation. The risk
of a noncomplying bulk sale notwithstanding, the administration
of an inventory loan requires the secured party to monitor the
debtor's business. 5 ' Thus the monitoring costs incurred in
preventing a bulk sales loss may be less for the secured party than
for the buyer, who often has no prior relationship with the debtorseller and no prior experience buying in bulk.
Insuring against the loss is an alternative to preventing it by
giving public notice or monitoring. Although neither the secured
party nor the buyer in bulk is likely to have market insurance
available, both parties can self-insure. For example, each can obtain a surety. 52 Alternatively or additionally, the secured party can
149. Sections 6-104(2) and 6-106(2) refer specifically to disputed claims. Comment 1 to
§ 6-109 states that "[tihe claims referred to of course include unliquidated claims"; accord
Rapson, supra note 12, at 227 ("creditors" in Article 6 "probably includes" holders of unliquidated claims). Contra Aluminum Shapes, Inc. v. K-A Liquidating Co., 290 F. Supp. 356,
358 (W.D. Pa. 1968) (§ 6-109(1) "refers to persons holding liquidated claims rather than
assertions of potential liability for breach of contract") (alternate holding). To the effect
that the pro rata distribution required by § 6-106(3) is subject to priorities, see cases cited
supra note 136.
150. Professors Baird and Jackson have criticized the Code's distinction among buyers
on the basis of their knowledge. Baird & Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the
Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 312-18 (1984). Others have suggested that
knowledge should play a greater role in Article 9's priority scheme. See, e.g., Felsenfeld,
Knowledge as a Factor in DeterminingPrioritiesUnder the Uniform Commercial Code, 42
N.Y.U. L. REv. 246 (1967); Nickles, supra note 86, at 72-103.
151. By selling inventory in ordinary course of business and dissipating the proceeds,
the debtor can render the secured party unsecured.
152. For suggestions regarding the bulk buyer's use of a bond issued by a compensated
surety, see Miller, How to Conduct a Bulk Sale, PRAc. LAw., Jan. 1955, at 78, 82. An uncompensated surety may be available. Indeed, an agreement by the selling corporation's parent
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self-insure by raising interest charges, and the buyer can self-insure by decreasing the purchase price or increasing the price he
charges to his customers. The secured party is likely to be in a
better position to spread the risk. The secured party typically has
many debtors, whereas the buyer in bulk is likely to have only one
bulk seller. Because the loss often deprives him of the inventory
transferred, the buyer in bulk may have greater difficulty passing
the loss to his customers. On the other hand, the buyer in bulk is
able in effect to reduce the purchase price by placing it in escrow
or otherwise out of the seller's reach, to be available for the satisfaction of the seller's creditors until the statute of limitations runs.
The apparent popularity of this technique suggests it is less costly
than compliance with the notice requirements of Article 6.153
The cost of negotiating an arrangement whereby a portion of
the purchase price is withheld to protect the noncomplying buyer
in bulk against claims arising from Article 6 may be less than one
first might imagine. The general rule that shields the buyer of business assets from liability for obligations incurred by the seller does
not always afford complete immunity to the buyer. 154 For example,
when the buyer continues to manufacture and distribute the
seller's product line, some courts may impose strict tort liability
upon the buyer for defects in products manufactured and distributed by the seller. 155 If he acquires the seller's real estate along
to indemnify the bulk buyer has been characterized as "the result of a standard business
practice to provide financial savings and business security." Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. P. & F.
Indus., 63 A.D.2d 1014, 1014, 406 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); cf. U.C.C. § 7710 (May 1949 draft), reprintedin 8 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 17, at 687-88 (acceptance of
the seller's bond with a corporate surety fulfills the bulk buyer's obligation to apply the sale
proceeds to the seller's creditors). Section 7-710 was deleted in the October 1949 revision.
153. The use of an escrow as an alternative to compliance with Article 6 is discussed
in, e.g., M. LANE,

PURCHASE AND SALE OF SMALL

BusiNEss 16 (1985); 6 W. HAWKLAND, supra

note 43, Art. 6 at 72; cf. U.C.C. § 7-710 (May 1949 draft), reprinted in 8 U.C.C. Drafts,
supra note 17, at 687 (deposit of sale proceeds with a responsible agency under an escrow
agreement fulfills the bulk buyer's obligation to apply the sale proceeds to the seller's creditors). A number of attorneys whose practices involve bulk sales have commented to me that,
in lieu of compliance with Article 6, the parties agree that some or all of the sale proceeds
will be held by the seller or in escrow. Writing 30 years ago, Professor Miller suggested that
establishing an escrow probably would be less costly than obtaining a bond. Miller, supra
note 152, at 82.
154. See supra note 19.
155. See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977);
Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); see also Phillips,
ProductLine Continuity and Successor CorporationLiability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 906 (1983)
(discussing cases and offering a theory of liability), criticized in Schulman, Commentary:
Successor CorporationLiability and the Inadequacy of the Product Line Continuity Approach, 31 WAYNE L. REv. 135 (1984). But see, e.g., Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d
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with the inventory, the buyer in bulk may be held liable for the
15
costs of cleaning up environmental hazards created by the seller. 6
In some states, the buyer in bulk may become liable for taxes owed
by the seller. 157 Because of the absence of market insurance, the
parties not uncommonly set aside a portion of the purchase price
from which the buyer can indemnify himself if he incurs liability.158 These types of potential liability do not accompany every
bulk sale, but when they do, they are likely to impose upon the
seller considerably greater risks than does noncompliance with Article 6. Consequently, the marginal cost of expanding the withholding arrangement to take account of potential losses from failure to
comply with Article 6 would seem to be small. Even when Article 6
risks predominate, the short, six-month limitations period for asserting Article 6 claims1 59 reduces the costs of withholding a portion of the purchase price.
Based on the foregoing, it is difficult to determine which class
of parties is able to avoid the loss at less cost. The costs of properly perfecting a security interest appear to be less than those of
complying with Article 6; secured parties are likely to have lower
monitoring costs than buyers in bulk; and they probably are able
to spread the risk more efficiently. If most buyers in bulk would
1047 (Fla. 1982) (refusing to impose liability on the transferee); Jones v. Johnson Mach. &
Press Co., 211 Neb. 724, 320 N.W.2d 481 (1982) (same).
156. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a) (1982).
157. See, e.g., MICH. Comp'. LAws ANN. § 205.59(2) (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. TAX LAw
§ 1141 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
158. See Heitland, Survival of Products Liability Claims in Assets Acquisitions, 34
Bus. LAw. 489, 498 (1979) (suggesting that a buyer may wish to use an escrow of some or all
of the purchase price to secure the seller's obligation to indemnify him).
159. U.C.C. § 6-111. Noncomplying buyers who set aside a portion of the purchase
price in lieu of complying with Article 6 run the risk of extending the limitations period.

Concealment of the transfer tolls the limitations period until the transfer is discovered. Id.
Courts disagree about whether the failure to comply with Article 6 ipso facto constitutes a

concealment. See, e.g., Lang v. Graham (In re Borba), 736 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1984) (construing California law) (tolling provision of § 6-111 refers to affirmative concealment, not to
mere failure to give notice); Columbian Rope Co. v. Rinek Cordage Co., 314 Pa. Super. 585,
461 A.2d 312 (1983) (when circumstances do not reveal to creditors that transfer has occurred, complete failure to give notice is concealment); SVM Inv. v. Mexican Exporters,
Inc., 685 S.W.2d 424, 430 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (concealment requires affirmative efforts at
concealing the transfer and complete and total failure to comply with Article 6 notice provisions). If the bulk seller files a bankruptcy petition during the six-month period, the statute
of limitations is tolled. At any time during the two years following the filing of the petition,
the seller's bankruptcy trustee may commence a proceeding to assert Article 6 rights. See
Murdock v. Plymouth Enters., (In re Curtina Int'l, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 969, 975 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982); 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 544(b), 550 (1982).
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withhold some or all of the purchase price regardless of the potential bulk sale risk, it would appear that, as a class, buyers in bulk
are able to avoid the loss at less cost than secured parties. Otherwise, I am uncertain whether the costs of withholding are less than
the costs that secured parties must incur to avoid the loss.
In determining the efficient cost avoider, one also must consider the possibility that for both parties, the cost of prevention
may exceed the anticipated loss. In that case, to minimize losses,
the loss should fall on the class of parties whose loss is likely to be
lower. That class would seem to be the secured parties. The anticipated loss that a secured party would suffer if a noncomplying
buyer in bulk took free of its unperfected security interest would
be (a) the anticipated value of the loss of the security interest, reduced by (b) the anticipated value of other debt collection remedies. The former, (a), is a result of the net value of the goods (net
proceeds following a foreclosure sale) and of any recovery against
the buyer personally,16 0 discounted by the likelihood of a noncomplying bulk transfer's occurring. The latter, (b), is the net recovery
from other sources-from the debtor personally, from the goods
transferred, 161 and from the buyer in bulk ' 6 2-discounted by the
160. A secured party, whether perfected or unperfected, upon the debtor's default acquires the right to retake the goods from any person who holds them subject to a security
interest, see U.C.C. §§ 9-306 comment 3, 9-503; Nickles, supra note 69, at 512-17 and cases
cited therein, and recover the secured debt from the proceeds of a foreclosure sale, see
U.C.C. § 9-504; Nickles, supra note 69, at 517-20. The secured party also may enforce the
security interest through the judicial process. U.C.C. § 9-501(1). A bulk buyer who receives
goods subject to a security interest and disposes of them may be personally liable to the
secured party for their value on the theory of conversion. See id. § 9-306 comment 3; Nickles, supra note 69, at 520-39; see also Charles S. Martin Distrib. Co. v. Indon Indus., 134 Ga.
App. 179, 181, 213 S.E.2d 900, 902-03, af'd, 234 Ga. 845, 218 S.E.2d 562 (1975) (security
interest was perfected).
161. If the security interest does not survive a bulk sale, the secured party would become unsecured and, like other unsecured creditors of the seller, would have to resort to
judicial process to recover the goods from the bulk buyer. For discussions of the remedies of
creditors aggrieved by a noncomplying bulk sale, see, e.g., 6 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 43,
§§ 6-104:09-:11; J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 8, §§ 19-5, 19-7.
162. At least one court has construed optional § 6-106 to impose upon a bulk buyer
personal liability for the debts of the seller, up to the amount of new consideration payable
to the buyer. See Darby v. Ewing's Home Furnishings, 278 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
Other courts have imposed personal liability on the noncomplying bulk buyer when the
goods were unavailable to satisfy the claims of the seller's creditors. See, e.g., Moskowitz v.
Michaels Artists & Eng'g Supplies, Inc., 29 Colo. App. 44, 477 P.2d 465 (1970) (relying on
Darby, although § 6-106 not locally enacted); Cornelius v. J & R Motor Supply Corp., 468
S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1971) (relying on pre-Code law notwithstanding local enactment of § 6106). Others have relied upon the failure to enact § 6-106 in a particular jurisdiction as one
ground among others for refusing to impose personal liability on the noncomplying bulk
buyer. See Bill Voorhees Co. v. R & S Camper Sales, 605 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying
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likelihood of recovery. If the loss were placed on the noncomplying
buyer in bulk (that is, if he took the goods subject to an unperfected security interest), his anticipated loss would be greater
than the secured party's because of both factors. The value of factor (a) would appear to be greater for buyers in bulk than for secured parties for two reasons. First, the value of the goods to the
buyer is wholesale or retail value, 163 whereas the value to the secured party is a lower liquidation value, reduced by the costs of
locating, retaking, and selling the goods. 164 Second, the likelihood
that the goods are subject to an unperfected security interest is
greater than the likelihood that they will be sold in a noncomplying bulk transfer. The value of (b) for buyers in bulk is likely to be
lower than for secured parties. Although both have a right to recover from the seller, 6 5 the secured party has additional potential
sources of recovery that reduce its anticipated loss. That is, the
secured party that loses its security interest would have Article 6
rights against the goods and perhaps against the noncomplying
1 66
buyer in bulk.
In short, it appears that the class of secured parties will place
a lower value on the loss than will the class of buyers in bulk. Accordingly, if costs of prevention exceed the loss for both classes,
the loss should be placed on the secured parties, which value it
less.
The inquiry, however, does not end here. Imposing the risk of
loss on one party rather than the other may affect levels of compliance with Article 6 and Article 9 notice requirements. The buyer in
bulk is likely to be sensitive to the allocation of the risk of loss
because, when compared to the other risks of noncompliance, the
risk of losing the goods to an unperfected secured party would be
large. Aggrieved unsecured creditors must seek their remedy
against him within six months after he takes possession of the
goods; unperfected secured parties are likely to have a longer limiAlabama law). For a discussion of non-Code theories of personal liability, see id. at 890.
163. For equipment, the value will be use value.
164. The secured party may recover these costs from the proceeds of the sale of the
collateral, see U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a), or from the debtor personally. In the event that the
secured party has a right to recover from the bulk buyer on the theory of conversion, see
supra note 160, the value of factor (a) to the secured party would be the market value of the
goods. See Nickles, supra note 69, at 536-39. In any case, the value of factor (a) to the
secured party will not exceed the secured debt.
165. The debtor is liable to the secured party on the secured debt and to the bulk
buyer for breach of the warranty of title in § 2-312(1)(b).
166. See supra notes 121-25, 161-62 and accompanying text.
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tations period.1 6 7 Whereas an unsecured creditor may be reluctant
to invoke the judicial process, with its attendant costs and delay,
the unperfected secured party may exercise self-help against the
noncomplying buyer.168 The debt owed to any particular unsecured
creditor is likely to be smaller than a debt secured by inventory;
accordingly, the aggrieved secured creditor is likely to obtain a
167. In determining the appropriate limitations period, one must distinguish between
the rights Article 9 awards to a secured party and the rights Article 6 awards to aggrieved
creditors of the bulk seller. The six-month statute of limitations in § 6-111 does not bar all
remedies against the goods. Rather, it provides specifically that "[n]o action under this Article [6] shall be brought nor levy made more than six months after the date on which the
transferee took possession of the goods." U.C.C. § 6-111 (emphasis added). The perfected
secured party's cause of action against the buyer for conversion of the collateral, see Nickles, supra note 69; Wechsler, supra note 69, is independent from its Article 6 rights. Thus,
regardless of whether the bulk buyer complies with Article 6, the perfected secured party is
not bound by § 6-111 and instead may avail itself of the longer limitations period for conversion. See Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey v. Jones, 197 N.J. Super. 475, 481, 485 A.2d
316, 319 (1984) ("If a claim is asserted based upon rights available irrespective of Article 6,
the limitation section will not apply"; case did not involve a secured party). The McBee
court's assertion to the contrary, 714 F.2d at 1328, is erroneous. The Georgia Supreme Court
makes a similar mistake. Although it recognizes the distinction between rights arising from
noncompliance with Article 6 and rights that are independent from Article 6, it erroneously
places a perfected secured party's conversion action against a noncomplying bulk buyer in
the former category. Indon Indus., v. Charles S. Martin Distrib. Co., 234 Ga. 845, 218 S.E.2d
562 (1975).
The McBee court suggests further that the four-month period for refiling upon a name
change of the debtor, U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (second sentence), is inapplicable to bulk transfer
cases because "it would in effect reduce the specific provision in Article 6 from six to four
months." 714 F.2d at 1329 n.19. That suggestion also is incorrect. The four-month period in
§ 9-402(7), second sentence, is not a statute of limitations, nor does the expiration of the
period affect the secured party's rights in transferred goods. Rather, the sentence refers to
the effectiveness of a financing statement, filed under the debtor's original name, with respect to property acquired by the debtor after the debtor's name changes. Even had McBee
concerned a change of the debtor's name instead of a transfer of collateral from the debtor
to a third party, the effect of the second sentence in § 9-402(7) would do no more than to
render unperfected a security interest in those goods acquired by the debtor more than four
months after the name change. Although the secured party would lose priority in those
after-acquired goods to a subsequent, perfected security interest, the secured party would
not be barred from enforcing its security interest after the four-month period expired.
The text argues, and Frydlewicz holds, that unlike a perfected security interest, which
survives regardless of whether the bulk buyer complies with Article 6, an unperfected security interest may survive in some cases solely because of the bulk buyer's noncompliance. In
those cases, one can argue that the secured party has rights in the transferred goods only
because Article 6 makes the transfer "ineffective," see U.C.C. §§ 6-104(1), 6-105, and that,
accordingly, the six-month statute of limitations in § 6-111 should apply. On the other hand,
one may argue that, absent an exception, a security agreement is effective against purchasers of the collateral, see id. § 9-201, and that therefore the unperfected secured party whose
collateral is sold in a noncomplying bulk sale should have the same limitations period as any
other secured party that enforces a security interest. To the extent one wishes to increase
the costs to a noncomplying buyer, one would prefer the latter reading.
168. See supra note 160.
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larger recovery. Thus, the loss incurred by denying a secured party
its Article 6 protections may be greater than that incurred by
omitting another creditor. Moreover, to the extent that secured
debt constitutes a large portion of all the seller's debt, the relative
importance of giving any notice at all increases. Finally, in many
cases the buyer in bulk is likely to respond to the risk of losing the
goods to an unperfected secured party by complying with Article 6,
rather than withholding a portion of the purchase price. Withholding works well in part because the statute of limitations for asserting claims arising under Article 6 is a brief six months. As indicated, an aggrieved secured party whose security interest survives
a bulk transfer may not be subject to the six-month limitations
statute. The longer that the purchase price is withheld, the more
costly the arrangement becomes. The costlier it becomes, the less
69
likely it will be used.1
One cannot anticipate a similar responsiveness by secured parties to the allocation of loss. The anticipated loss to a noncomplying buyer in bulk is small relative to other losses attributable to
being unperfected. A bulk sale jeopardizes only that portion of the
inventory that is sold, and it is not a common occurrence. Bankruptcy filings are more frequent and cause an unperfected secured
party to lose the entire collateral. 17 0 The relatively small increase
in risk attributable to a noncomplying bulk transfer is likely to be
insufficient to motivate an unperfected secured party to effectuate
a proper filing. Inasmuch as many security interests are unperfected because of defective filings,' 7 ' the secured party that
does respond to the allocation of risk of a noncomplying bulk sale
might respond through means other than a proper filing. For example, it might monitor the debtor more closely, discover the impending sale, and seize the collateral or inform the buyer of the
security interest before the buyer receives delivery of the goods.
Buyers in bulk seem to be more likely to respond to differences in risk allocation than are secured parties. 7 2 A rule that pre169. Should withholding become more costly, bulk buyers may choose methods of loss
prevention or insurance other than compliance with Article 6 (for example, reducing the
purchase price or monitoring the debtor more intensively).
170. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1982); U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b); id. § 9-301(3).
171. See Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 734 n.26, 764
n.117 (1984). The text accompanying notes 142-45 supra suggests the major causes of filing
errors.
172. The responsiveness of bulk buyers to risk allocation depends on their apprecia-

tion of the risks. An unknown but perhaps significant portion of bulk buyers is unaware of
Article 6 and will not respond to increased risk. See supra note 46. Nevertheless, if the risks
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serves an unperfected security interest in goods that are the subject of a noncomplying bulk sale probably would increase
compliance with Article 6 without reducing Article 9 filings noticeably. Assuming that both Article 9 filing and compliance with Article 6 notice requirements are efficient,17 3 that rule would be desirable. If, however, the class of secured parties is able to avoid the
loss at less cost than the class of buyers in bulk, then one cannot
determine which rule (preserving or destroying unperfected security interests in goods that are the subject of a noncomplying bulk
sale) is more efficient. Being more certain of the differential compliance effect than of the relative costs of compliance, I would integrate Article 9 with Article 6 as suggested above: under section 9301(1)(c) an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the
rights of a noncomplying transferee in bulk; under sections 6-104,
6-105 and, where enacted, 6-106, failure to comply with Article 6
renders the transfer ineffective against creditors of the transferor;
thus the rights that the noncomplying buyer acquires are no
greater than those of his transferor-that is, they are subject to the
unperfected security interest.

IV.

THE RIGHTS OF A SECURED PARTY WHOSE COLLATERAL IS SOLD
IN BULK AGAINST TRANSFEREES FROM THE BUYER

The preceding part discusses the rights of a secured party
whose collateral has been sold in bulk to recover from the buyer of
the collateral. This part considers how the transfer of the goods or
of an interest in them to a third party affects the secured party's
rights. Following the format of part III, this part first analyzes the
rights of a perfected secured party and then evaluates the rights of
one that is unperfected.
associated with noncompliance become greater, one can expect some increased awareness of
Article 6. The present, widespread noncompliance with Article 6 results not only from ignorance of the statute's requirements, but also from calculated judgments made by informed
bulk buyers. These buyers can be expected to respond to risk allocation.
173. I am assuming only that, given the legal recognition of secured credit, filing is
efficient. I make no assumptions concerning the efficiency of secured credit itself. For discussions of the latter issue, see Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Levmore, Monitors and Freeridersin Commercial and CorporationSettings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Schwartz, supra note 30 (finding
efficiency explanations of secured credit wanting); Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984) (same); White, Efficiency Justificationsfor Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1984). For expressions of doubt about the
economic efficiency of Article 6, see A. SCHWARTZ & R. Scor, supra note 31, at 506; Rapson,
supra note 14, passim.
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The Rights of a Perfected Secured Party

1.

Against a Secured Party Whose Debtor Is the Buyer in Bulk
As part III. A. explains, a perfected security interest
in inventory survives a bulk sale, whether complying or noncomplying. The
buyer in bulk may use the inventory to secure a debt to a different
secured party. Which of the two security interests has priority? A
proper reading of Article 9 awards priority to the seller's secured
party (SP1), and Article 6 does not change this result.
(a) Prioritiesin the Transferred Collateral: The General Rule
Assume that after the buyer acquires the inventory, his secured party (SP2) extends a working capital loan and takes a security interest in the buyer's existing and after-acquired inventory
and equipment, including the goods transferred in bulk. Under the
general rule in section 9-312(5), SP1 will have priority, inasmuch
as it was the first to file its financing statement or perfect its security interest.
One can imagine a scenario in which SP2 is the first to file or
perfect. For example, the buyer in bulk may be an established
merchant who, long prior to the bulk sale, granted a security interest in his existing and after-acquired inventory to SP2. If SP2 were
to file before SP1, then section 9-312(5) would appear to award
priority to SP2. In my view, the application of section 9-312(5) to
that priority dispute would be inappropriate.
The first-to-file-or-perfect rule of section 9-312(5) is a variation of the "first in time, first in right" rule that pervades property
law. The latter rule is a specific application of the basic principle
of conveyancing: one cannot convey better title than he has.17 '
Once the debtor encumbers his interest in the goods with a security interest, any person whose interest derives from the debtor will
take subject to the encumbrance. Thus, under a strict first-in-time
rule, the first party to take a security interest in collateral would
have priority over later secured parties. Section 9-312(5) modifies
the rule to cure the ostensible ownership problem that was discussed in part II. For the first security interest to be effective
against a subsequent secured party, the first creditor must publicize his interest, usually by filing. Among the penalties for failure
to publicize is the loss of priority to subsequent creditors who may
be disadvantaged by the absence of publicity.
174.

See supra note 55.
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Comment 1 to section 1-102 explains that "the proper construction of the [Code] requires that its interpretation and application be limited to its reason." In the case under consideration-the
buyer in bulk acquires goods subject to SP1's perfected security
interest, SP2's security interest attaches automatically to the afteracquired inventory, and SP2 has filed before SP1-the reason for
section 9-312(5) is inapplicable. Prior to the contract of sale between the buyer and the seller, the buyer had no rights in the inventory. Accordingly, SP2 had no interest in the goods1 5 and
could not possibly have been disadvantaged by a secret security
interest in favor of SP1. SP1 publicized its interest by filing before
SP2's interest attached, and SP2 could have discovered the encumbrance by checking the files. 76 Having failed to discover SP1's security interest, SP2 should take subject to it. Conversely, having
appropriately cured the ostensible ownership problem before SP2
could have relied to its detriment on the seller's apparently unencumbered ownership, SP1 should not suffer a penalty when its
debtor, without authorization, later sells the collateral in bulk. If
one does not impose the penalty of section 9-312(5), one must apply the ordinary rule of section 2-403(1), under which the purchaser (SP2) acquires no greater rights than his transferor (the
buyer) had or had power to convey; that is, SP2 takes his security
interest subject to those encumbrances that are effective against
17 7
the buyer, including SP1's security interest.
Comment 5 to section 9-312 suggests a second justification for
the first-to-file rule: "the necessity of protecting the filing system-that is, of allowing the secured party who has first fied to
make subsequent advances without each time having, as a condi175. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c).
176. Ordinary course sales cut off most security interests. See id. § 9-307(1). When
SP2's debtor acquires collateral that once may have been farm products, SP2 has some
reason to suspect that the goods may be encumbered by a security interest, inasmuch as
§ 9-307(1) does not cut off security interests in farm products even when the goods are sold
to a buyer in ordinary course. There may be no similar warning that a bulk sale has occurred, because the relative size of the transfer, not its absolute size, and the nature of the
transferor's enterprise are determinative. See id. § 6-102(1) (bulk transfer is transfer of "a
major part" of the inventory of "an enterprise subject to this Article [6]"). Thus, as a practical matter, SP2 may prefer to run the relatively small risk that its debtor is acquiring encumbered inventory as the transferee of a bulk transfer rather than to investigate the source
of the debtor's title and the circumstances of the transfer. The fact that newly acquired
equipment has been previously owned puts SP2 on notice that the equipment may be subject to encumbrances. That risk may justify an investigation, which probably will be less
costly than in the case of inventory.
177. See also id. § 9-201 ("a security agreement is effective. . . against purchasers of
the collateral and against creditors").
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tion of protection, to check for filings later than his." In the usual
case, concerning only one debtor, the consequences of removing the
search burden from the first to file and placing it on the second to
file are not clearly undesirable. A potential creditor can check the
filings, discover the first secured party's filing, and conduct himself
accordingly. Ordinarily he will take second priority, but he can acquire first priority by taking a purchase money security interest
17 8
and notifying the first secured party of that fact.
When two debtors are involved, as may be the case following a
bulk sale, the consequences of applying section 9-312(5) are clearly
undesirable. When SP1 takes a security interest in the seller's inventory, it will not discover SP2's security interest because it has
no reason to investigate the title of goods owned by persons other
than its debtor. If section 9-312(5) were applied to the case under
consideration, then SP1 may be completely unable to protect itself;1 79 whereas if SP1 were afforded priority, then SP2 would be
able to discover that the inventory was encumbered and would refuse to make an advance against it. The Code generally affords the
inventory lender considerable protection against third party claims
to the collateral and so minimizes the need for an inventory lender
178. See id. § 9-312(3). For equipment and other noninventory collateral, giving notice
is not a prerequisite for acquiring a purchase-money priority. See id. § 9-312(4).
179. Once the goods are identified to the contract, the buyer acquires rights in them
and SP2's security interest attaches. See id. § 2-501 (buyer's special property arises on identification); id. § 9-203(1)(c); 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 30, at 353; Baird & Jackson, supra
note 58, at 203. If the seller remains in possession, SP1 might be able to avoid the buyer's
interest as a fraudulent conveyance under non-Code law and thus under § 2-402(2). The
section's safe harbor for commerically reasonable retention of possession by a merchantseller may not be available to the buyer, because retention arguably is not "in the current
course of trade." U.C.C. § 2-402(2). Even if SP1 can avoid the buyer's rights, SP2 may
qualify as a good faith purchaser for value from a person with voidable title and may take
good title, free from SPI's right to avoid the transfer to the buyer. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v.
Mills Oil Co., 717 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1983); Lavonia Mfg. v. Emery Corp. (In re Emery
Corp.), 52 Bankr. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Petroleum Specialties, Inc. v. McLouth Steel Corp.
(In re McLouth Steel Corp.), 22 Bankr. 722 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); U.C.C. § 2-403(1)
(second sentence); id. § 1-201(33). But see McDonnell, The FloatingLienor as Good Faith
Purchaser,50 S. CAL. L. REv. 429 (1977) (recommending that a secured party not be afforded good-faith-purchase treatment unless it relies to its detriment on particular afteracquired property); Rapson, A "Home Run" Application of EstablishedPrinciples of Statutory Construction:U.C.C. Analogies, 5 CARDozo L. REv. 441, 445-47 (1984) (same); see also
Collingwood Grain, Inc. v. Coast Trading Co. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 744 F.2d 686, 69091 (9th Cir. 1984) (good-faith-purchase rights under § 2-403(1) do not arise until delivery to
the buyer or the buyer's designee); Baird & Jackson, supra note 58, at 202-05 (buyer must
have possession in order to convey good-faith-purchase rights); Dolan, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Concept of Possession in the Marketing and Financingof Goods, 56
Tax. L. REv. 1147, 1172-73 (1978) (suggesting that possession is a necessary element of voidable title).
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to investigate the source of his collateral. 8 0 Nevertheless, an inventory lender may become aware that his debtor has acquired inventory through a transfer in bulk. Placing the risk of loss on SP2,
who can prevent the loss by refusing to lend, rather than on SP1,
who may be unable to prevent it, 18 1 seems reasonable. Thus, in the
context of a bulk sale when each perfected secured party has a different debtor, I would read Article 9 to grant priority to SP1 re82
gardless of when each secured party filed.
One can, however, read section 6-110 as reordering the priorities when a noncomplying buyer in bulk is SP2's debtor. Section 6110 provides as follows:
When the title of a transferee to property is subject to a defect by reason
of his non-compliance with the requirements of this Article, then:
(1) a purchaser of any such property from such transferee who pays no
value or who takes with notice of such non-compliance takes subject to such
defect, but
(2) a purchaser for value in good faith and without such notice takes free
of such defect.183

In McBee the inventory lender of the buyer in bulk (our SP2) argued that as a secured party it was a "purchaser," that it gave
value and took its security interest in good faith and without notice of the buyer's failure to comply with Article 6, and that therefore it took its security interest free from the claims of the seller's
180. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1); supra note 176.
181. Even if SP1 discovers that a debtor plans a bulk transfer, it may be too late for
him to prevent SP2's rights from arising. See supra note 179.
182. To the best of my knowledge, only two authors previously have recognized that
§ 9-312 may not apply to security interests created by different debtors and have attempted
to explain why. Perhaps not coincidentally, the authors were colleagues at the University of
Kansas Law School. Noting that all the examples in the comments to § 9-312 concern security interests created by a single debtor, Professor Charles H. Oldfather advances the proposition that the section contemplates only cases of that kind. Oldfather, Floor Plan Financing Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 U. KAN. L. REv. 571, 582-84
(1966). Although, as the text indicates, I agree with his conclusion, I do not endorse all the
particulars of Professor Oldfather's analysis. For example, he argues by analogy to a case in
which SP2's debtor is a purchaser from a thief. There would be no priority contest at all in
that case, however, because SP2's debtor would have no rights in the collateral, and so SP2's
security interest would not attach. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c). I am dubious also about Professor Oldfather's conclusions regarding cases in which SP2 is a purchase money secured party.
See infra notes 197-205 and accompanying text. Professor Barkley Clark's discussion of the
"Double Debtor Dilemma" is more consistent with this Article's analysis. See B. CLARK,
supra note 89, at 3.8[4] (1980); see also Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired
Property Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 925, 948 (citing
Oldfather, supra,on the inapplicability of § 9-312 in a two-debtor case and concluding that
SPI has priority because of §§ 9-306(2) and 2-403).
183. U.C.C. § 6-110.
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perfected secured creditors (our SP1).184 Finding SP2's argument

"not persuasive," the Fifth Circuit panel reaches the correct result.185 Unfortunately, it constructs its own unpersuasive argument, which it bases on a tortured reading of section 6-110. The
court acknowledges that under the Code the term "purchaser" may
include a secured party. 86 It goes on, in the absence of authority,
to "find it clear that the term as used in Section 6-110 was not
intended to include secured creditors. '8 7 It proffers two reasons
for its conclusion. One reason is the court's doubt about "whether
a subsequent creditor could assert a claim that it took its interest
'without notice,"' inasmuch as SP1 had filed a financing statement. 8 8 The court thus would charge the subsequent creditor
(SP2) with "notice" of a perfected security interest, notwithstanding the Code's definition of "notice," which clearly does not include constructive notice from the filing system. 189 In other words,
to support its refusal to follow the Code's definition of "purchaser," the court ignores as well the Code's definition of "notice"
and substitutes for it the court's own definition. Even if one follows the McBee court's erroneous assumption that a subsequent
secured party (e.g., SP2) has "notice" of a prior perfected security
interest, that party would not ipso facto have notice of the particular fact that would disqualify it from receiving good-faith-purchase
treatment under section 6-110(2): the buyer in bulk's "non-compliance with the requirements of this Article [6]."190 The court's sec-

ond argument for creating a special, Article 6 definition of "purchaser" is also weak. The court argues that, inasmuch as Article 6
contemplates that perfected security interests survive a noncomplying bulk sale, to allow a subsequent security interest to cut off
those presale security interests would be "at odds with the specific
purpose behind Article 6."''91
The McBee court has difficulty because it neither reads section 6-110 carefully nor understands its purpose. The section does
not provide that a good faith purchaser for value without notice
184. 714 F.2d at 1330.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See U.C.C. § 1-201(25); cf. id. § 9-309 (Article 9 filing does not constitute notice
to a holder in due course, a holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly
negotiated, or a bona fide purchaser of a security).
190. Id. § 6-110(2).
191. 714 F.2d at 1330.
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takes free of prior perfected security interests. It provides instead
that a purchaser of that kind "takes free of such defect," a defect
in the buyer's title "by reason of his non-compliance with the requirements of this Article [6]. ''l92 As discussed above, the McBee
court is wrong in its belief that a buyer in bulk takes free of an
existing, perfected security interest if the buyer complies with Article 6. In fact, Article 9 explicitly provides to the contrary, and
Article 6 does not purport to enlarge the buyer's rights. A perfected security interest survives a bulk sale regardless of whether
the buyer complies with Article 6.193 The security interest therefore is not a title "defect by reason of [the buyer's] non-compliance
with the requirements" of Article 6.194 Accordingly, section 6-110
does not purport to affect the security interest. With section 6-110
inapplicable, the general priority rules apply, and SP1 takes priority over SP2 regardless of which party filed first.1 95 The court is
correct that the Code imposes upon SP2 the risk of failing to discover SP1's security interest. 196 But just as Article 9 (and not Article 6) provides for SPI's perfected security interest to survive the
bulk sale, so Article 9 and not Article 6 protects SP's priority over
SP2.
The court's treatment of SPI's filing as notice to SP2 suggests
that the court realizes that section 6-110 addresses a problem of
ostensible ownership and that SP1 has cured that problem by filing. Unfortunately, the court focuses on the wrong ostensible ownership problem. The priority rules of Article 9 address unpublicized security interests. Section 6-110 addresses the secret claims
that Article 6 creates: the right of the seller's creditors to reach the
goods in the hands of the buyer. If SP2 justifiably relies to its detriment on the buyer's possession of the goods, then it will take free
of those secret claims, not of all claims of the seller's creditors.
(b) Prioritiesin the Transferred Collateral: SP2's Purchase
Money Security Interest
For a number of purposes, Article 9 affords special treatment
to creditors whose loans enable their debtors to acquire rights in
the collateral-purchase money secured parties. 97 Specifically, sec192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

U.C.C. § 6-110.
See supra notes 64-102 and accompanying text.
U.C.C. § 6-110.
See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
714 F.2d at 1330.
See U.C.C. § 9-107(b).
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tion 9-312(3) provides an exception to the first-to-file-or-perfect
priority rule of section 9-312(5) and awards priority to the later,
purchase money secured party, provided it properly and timely
notifies the existing secured party of its interest. A commonly advanced reason for awarding priority to a purchase money secured
party is to aid a debtor whose existing and after-acquired assets
are encumbered in obtaining credit from another lender. 198 Absent
the purchase-money priority, the new lender could not obtain priority in the newly acquired goods without the existing secured
party's consent, and so it may be unwilling to lend. If the existing
secured party is unwilling to consent or to advance additional
credit, then the debtor may be unable to obtain credit from any
source. The special priority thus "give[s] the debtor somewhat
greater bargaining power and at least theoretically enlarge[s] his
ability to get credit."19 9 The purchase-money priority arguably is
not inimical to the interests of the existing lender. Without the
enabling loan, the debtor, and hence the secured party, would have
no interest in the additional inventory.
For goods other than inventory, a purchase money secured
party obtains priority if it perfects its purchase money security interest no later than ten days after the debtor receives possession of
the collateral. °° Inventory presents special ostensible ownership
problems, for which the Code prescribes special prerequisites to
obtaining purchase-money priority. Chief among these prerequisites is giving advance written notice to the holder of a conflicting
security interest in the same type of inventory. 01 As comment 3 to
section 9-312 explains, unlike lenders whose collateral is, say,
equipment, a secured party with an interest in after-acquired inventory often agrees to make periodic advances to the debtor
against newly acquired inventory. If the first secured party knows
that another secured party may have purchase-money priority, it is
not likely to be defrauded by the debtor into making an advance
against encumbered property.
Suppose that SP2 agrees to finance the acquisition of inventory in a bulk sale. Upon discovering SP1's interest, SP2 complies
198.
199.
200.
REV.

E.g., J. WHITE & R SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 1043.
Id.
U.C.C. § 9-312(4). Some states have extended this period to 20 days. E.g., ILL.
STAT. ch. 26, § 9-312(4) (1985); TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.312(d) (Vernon Supp.

1986).
201. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3). The other major requirement is that the purchase money
security interest be perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the inventory. Id.
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with all the requirements of section 9-312(3). Will SP2 obtain priority? Although the language of the section suggests an affirmative
answer, the better answer is "no." The purchase-money priority
was designed for cases concerning a single debtor who grants a security interest in after-acquired property to one creditor and who
subsequently grants a purchase money security interest to a second
creditor in property covered by the first creditor's after-acquired
property clause.2 02 Our priority contest, like the non-purchasemoney contest discussed above, is atypical in that SP1 and SP2 do
not share a common debtor. As with the first-in-time rule of section 9-312(5), the rationale for the purchase-money rule in section
9-312(3) is inapplicable to a case in which each secured party has a
different debtor. The reason for the purchase-money priority is to
aid a debtor in obtaining credit, without adversely affecting the in202. Professors Jackson and Kronman note that there is a "logical link between security interests in after-acquired property and purchase money security interests," as well as a
"strong and clear historical link between them." Jackson & Kronman, supra note 173, at
1165 n.70. They even state that "[i]f the law did not allow security interests in after-acquired property, no special priority rule for purchase money security interests would be
necessary." Id. (relying on 2 G. GiLMORE, supra note 30, § 28.1, at 746, and Note, The Priority Conflict Between a PurchaseMoney Security Interest and a PriorSecurity Interest in
Future Accounts Receivable, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1157, 1159 (1969)).
Interestingly, the theory of purchase-money priority, as it originally developed, was consistent with first-in-time and security of property principles. The first creditor acquired no
greater rights to after-acquired property than did its debtor. The purchase-money priority
originally extended only to conditional vendors, who retained an interest (title) in the goods
to secure the purchase price. Accordingly, the debtor acquired an encumbered interest, to
which the creditor's interest in after-acquired property thereafter attached. See, e.g., United
States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362, 365 (1870). The UCC has undercut the
foundations of this theory. It has expanded the concept of purchase money security interest
to include those "taken" to secure an enabling loan from one other than the seller. Compare
U.C.C. § 9-107(b) with e.g., Hughbanks, Inc. v. Gourley, 12 Wash. 2d 44, 120 P.2d 523
(1941). For many cases the UCC provides that the security interest in after-acquired property and the purchase money security interest attach and become perfected simultaneously,
when the debtor acquires rights in the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (when security interest attaches); id. § 9-303 (when security interest perfected). It makes timely public notice a
prerequisite for purchase-money priority. Compare id. § 9-312(3) and id. § 9-312(4) with
New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 365. Nevertheless, the original concept of title retention has not disappeared altogether. See, e.g., International Harvester Credit Corp. v.
American Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974) (security interest in after-acquired property
attaches only to the debtor's equity), overruled, 1978 Fla. Laws 222; cf. S. REP. No. 1708,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3722, 3725 (explaining priority of purchase money mortgages over previously filed federal tax lien on the
ground that the taxpayer acquires a right to liened property only to the extent the property's value exceeds the purchase-money debt).
In the case under consideration, SP1's perfected security interest arises first-before
the buyer in bulk, and hence his purchase money secured party (SP2), acquires any interest
in the goods. To award SP2 priority would have the curious effect of reversing the first-intime rule from which the present purchase-money priority derives.
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terests of the original secured party. In a two-debtor case, SP2
does not need a special priority rule as an incentive to finance the
inventory purchase. If the buyer were to purchase unencumbered
merchandise, instead of goods subject to a security interest, SP2
would be able easily to acquire a first-priority security interest. In
that case, SP2 should be willing to extend credit to the buyer for
the acquisition of inventory, even without a purchase-money priority over SP1.203 When there are two debtors, SP2's need for the
special priority arises not because the Code's ordinary priority
rules favor the first to file, but because SP2's debtor chooses to
acquire encumbered goods. Moreover, in a two-debtor case, one
cannot justify giving SP2 priority on the ground that but for SP2's
enabling loan, SP1 would not acquire any rights in the collateral.
On the contrary, the award of priority to SP2 would come at the
expense of SP1 and often would have the effect of depriving SP1
of its collateral altogether.0 4 The buyer took subject to SP1's security interest; SP2's rights derive from the buyer; SP2 can discover SP1's perfected interest. In the absence of a good reason to
prefer SP2 at SP1's expense, section 9-312(3) should not be read to
apply to cases, like those that may arise in a bulk sale, that concern two debtors. Instead, the basic conveyancing principle-the
transferee acquires no greater title than his transferor has-should

apply.205

203. Professors Jackson and Kronman observe that an after-acquired property clause
saves transaction costs, but creates a situational monopoly that increases the cost to the
debtor of subsequent credit from other creditors. In their view, the purchase-money priority
is efficient because it preserves those transaction costs savings while blunting the monopoly,
without the need to incur the cost of negotiating a contract that would compensate the
original secured party for the effects of the monopoly. In two-debtor cases, SP1 has no monopoly power over SP2's debtor. Accordingly, the first-in-time rule, which ordinarily is more
efficient, should apply. Cf. Jackson & Kromnan, supra note 173, at 1161-64 (arguing that
first-in-time rule is efficient in the single-debtor context).
204. Because the price paid for inventory purchased in bulk cannot be expected to
approach the sum of the prices for which the inventory could be sold in ordinary course, see
Nickles, supra note 86, at 119 n.689, SP1's right to the proceeds of a bulk sale is an inadequate substitute for continuation of the security interest.
205. Accordingly, the dicta that § 9-312(3) might apply to priority disputes between
our SP1 and SP2 are incorrect. In re McBee, 714 F.2d at 1331 n.21, 1327 n.16. McBee is not
alone in its assumption that the purchase-money priority rules would apply to security interests created by two different debtors and enable SP2 to prevail over SP1 when SP2's
debtor acquired the goods subject to SP1's security interest. See Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp. v. Middlesboro Motor Sales, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Ky. 1968) (dictum) ("It could
be that [§ 9-306(2)] is broad enough to protect [SP2], which with no knowledge of violation
of [SP1'ssecurity] agreement, loans money in this type situation in reliance on the apparent
authority of the retailer [SP1's debtor] to make the sales."); 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 30, at
913-14; cf. National Bank of Commerce v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 446 P.2d 277, 282
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(c) Prioritiesin the Buyer's After-Acquired Collateral
The preceding subparts resolve the competing claims of the
seller's secured party (SP1) and the buyer's secured party (SP2) to
goods that are the subject of a bulk transfer. They conclude that
when its security interest is perfected, SP1 will have priority, even
if SP2 files first or has a purchase money security interest. This
subpart considers the competing claims of the two secured parties
to goods that the buyer in bulk acquires after the bulk sale. In
sharp contrast to the result that obtains for the transferred goods,
SP2's claim to the buyer's after-acquired property nearly always
will prevail. Indeed, in most cases SP1 will have no claim at all to
those goods.
Although its security agreement is likely to cover after-acquired inventory, 06 SPI's security interest will not attach to any
particular item of inventory and will not become enforceable
against that item unless SPI's debtor, the seller in bulk, has rights
in the collateral. 20 7 This fundamental Article 9 rule is a particularlized restatement of the basic principle of conveyancing: one cannot transfer an interest in property in which one has no interest. 20 8
Even though the buyer in bulk may continue to do business under
the trade name of the seller, at the same location, and using the
same assets, the two parties usually are distinct legal persons. The
(Okla. 1968) (SP1 awarded priority under § 9-312(4) and as first to file). Two commentators
have expressed sympathy for SP2 when SP2's debtor is a retail buyer who does not qualify
as a buyer in ordinary course. See Oldfather, supra note 182, at 584 ("at best by inclusion as
a buyer in ordinary course or at worst under the general principles of estoppel pervading the
floor plan area, [SP2] may find its due measure of protection"); Skilton, Buyer in Ordinary
Course of Business Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (and Related Matters), 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1, 87 (priority depends on assessing the risks SP1 should be said to
assume in becoming an inventory financer). This Article suggests that estoppel against SPI
should not be presumed, see supra text accompanying notes 91-95, and that placing the risk
of loss on SP2 is likely to be economically efficient. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text; supra note 203.
206. Even if a security agreement covering inventory lacks an after-acquired property
clause, a court may construe the agreement to cover both existing and after-acquired inventory. E.g., In re Fibre Glass Boat Corp., 324 F. Supp. 1054, 1056 (S.D. Fla. 1971); BorgWarner Acceptance Corp. v. Wolfe City Nat'l Bank, 544 S.W.2d 947, 950-51 (Tex. Ct. App.
1976). But see, e.g., In re Taylored Prods., Inc., 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 286, 289-91
(Ref. W.D. Mich. 1968).
207. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c). Houchen v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Taylorville Eisner
Agency, Inc.), 445 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Il1 1977), holds that, under the last sentence of § 9402(7), a secured party with an after-acquired property clause obtains a security interest in
property that its debtor's transferee acquires after the transfer from persons other than the
debtor. The case is wrong and has been criticized. See, e.g., Burke, The Duty to Refile
Under Section 9-402(7) of the Revised Article 9, 35 Bus. LAw. 1083, 1100-02 (1980).
208. See supra note 55.
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seller thus has no rights in inventory that the buyer in bulk acquires from third parties. Accordingly, there is no priority contest
for that inventory. SP2's security interest is the only enforceable
security interest in the goods.
The recent Fifth Circuit opinion in McBee directly considers
the priority of competing secured parties in inventory that a noncomplying buyer in bulk acquired after the bulk sale. Remarkably,
the court gives the seller's secured party priority in the post-bulksale inventory, but only to the extent of the value of the inventory
transferred in the bulk sale. 0 9 That the result in McBee may be
incorrect2 10 is not nearly so disturbing as the serious error in the
court's analysis. Consider the implications of the following passage:
In the immediate case, all of the secured parties had a security interest
in the after-acquired property. By virtue of [the buyer's] failure to comply
with Article 6, this security interest in the ever-changing inventory-collateral
remained effective. [SP2's] contention that [the seller's] creditors' interest, if
any, was limited to the actual inventory transferred and which remained with
the gun shop at the time of [the buyer's] bankruptcy is therefore without
merit."'

For no apparent commercial purpose, the court permits the seller
to alienate the buyer's property without the buyer's consent. The
court's fundamental misunderstanding of the operation of an afteracquired property clause thus leads the court to violate a basic
principle of personal property law that the Code embodies.
Notwithstanding the general rule, the Code does provide two
rather limited ways in which SP1 can obtain a security interest in
inventory that the buyer in bulk acquires from parties other than
SPI's debtor. Interestingly, the successful use of either route is unrelated to SPI's claim to after-acquired property, which the McBee
court finds so essential.2 12
First, suppose that the buyer sells some of the transferred inventory for cash and uses the cash to purchase new inventory from
a third party. In that case, the cash and new inventory are the
proceeds of SPI's original collateral, and SPI's security interest
209. 714 F.2d at 1332.
210. For a discussion of the narrow circumstances under which the McBee result
would be correct, see infra text accompanying notes 219-25.
211. 714 F.2d at 1331.
212. Although the Fifth Circuit does not describe the scope of the various security
agreements, it does cite cases to the effect that unless the security agreement contraindicates, a security interest in "inventory" includes both existing and after-acquired inventory.
Id. at 1330-31, 1325 n.10. The bankruptcy court does likewise. In re McBee, 20 Bankr. 361
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983).
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continues in them, to the extent that they are identifiable.2 1 3 SP2's
security interest likewise will continue.2 14 Under the normal rule
that priority in proceeds dates from priority in the original collateral, SP1 will have priority in the new inventory.21 5 One difficulty
inherent in acquiring a security interest in the new inventory as
proceeds is the need for SP1 to identify particular inventory as
having been purchased with the proceeds of inventory transferred
in bulk.216 The buyer in bulk may prevent SP1 from tracing its
original collateral (the goods transferred in bulk) to new inventory
if the buyer commingles the original collateral with inventory acquired from other sources.
213. Moister v. National Bank (In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co.), 1 Bankr. 324,
328-29 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979) ("proceeds" includes proceeds from sale of collateral by bulk
transferee); see Peoples State Bank v. San Juan Packers, Inc. (In re San Juan Packers,
Inc.), 696 F.2d 707, 709-10 (9th Cir. 1983) ("proceeds" includes proceeds from sale by
debtor's transferee, who is a "debtor" under § 9-105(1)(d)); Baker Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Long Creek Meat Co., 266 Or. 643, 650, 513 P.2d 1129, 1132-33 (1973) ("proceeds" includes
whatever is received upon the sale of collateral by debtor's transferee); U.C.C. § 9-306(1)
(" '[p]roceeds' includes whatever is received upon the sale. . . of collateral"); id. § 9-306(2)
("security interest continues. . . in any indentifiable proceeds including collections received
by the debtor"). Contra Get It Kwik of Am., Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 361 So. 2d 568, 572
(Ala. Civ. App. 1978) ("proceeds" does not include proceeds from sale of collateral by bulk
buyer); see Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Colonial Trading Co., 81 York Leg. Rec. 87, 88, 43 Pa. D. &
C.2d 131, 132 (1967) (secured party has no right of action in assumpsit against purchaser of
collateral, "either for original debt or for the proceeds of resale"). By enabling a debtor to
grant a security interest in proceeds received by a third party who buys the collateral from
the debtor and then sells it, § 9-306(2) creates an exception to the nemo dat rule described
supra note 55.
214. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2). In addition to being SP2's proceeds, the new inventory will
be SP2's original collateral under the after-acquired property clause of its security agreement. See id. § 9-204(1). The Fifth Circuit to the contrary notwithstanding, the new inventory will not be SPI's original collateral. Compare In re McBee, 714 F.2d at 1331 n.21 with
U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c). But see infra text accompanying notes 219-25.
215. See generally U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2), 9-306(3), 9-312(5), 9-312(6). Although none of
these sections deals directly with the issue at hand, they all support the "normal rule" of
the text. The problem becomes more complicated if SP1's security interest becomes unperfected but SP2's does not. This may occur, for example, if inventory is sold on open
account and SPI has not filed in the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. Compareid.
§ 9-103(1)(b) (place of filing for ordinary goods) with id. § 9-103(3)(b) (place of filing for
accounts). Even if SP2 likewise becomes unperfected, SP2's security interest will attach to
new inventory acquired with the proceeds of the account and will be perfected upon attachment. See id. §§ 9-203(1), 9-303. For discussions of the problems created by lapsed perfection, see Pearson, Absolute Versus ConditionalProtectionfor Secured Parties:Problems of
Lapsed Perfection Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Hous. L. REv. 1
(1979); Zaretsky, Lapse of Perfection in Secured Transactions:A Search for a Consistent
Approach, 22 B.C.L. REv. 247 (1981).
216. See, e.g., Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279, 282 (W.D.
Pa. 1962) (burden on secured party to trace cash proceeds received from disposition of collateral into debtor's bank account).
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Ironically, the same commingling that may deny SP1 the benefit of the proceeds rule may provide another means by which SP1
may obtain a security interest in goods that the buyer in bulk acquires after the bulk sale. Section 9-315(1) provides that, if a security interest in goods is perfected before "the goods are so...
commingled that their identity is lost in the . . mass," then the
security interest continues in the mass. 1 7 This statutory analogue
to the equitable doctrine of confusion of goods arguably awards to
SP1 a security interest in the entire inventory of the buyer in bulk,
including goods acquired after the transfer in bulk, if commingling
has prevented SP1 from identifying its collateral. 2 18
To see how commingling affects SPI's rights, assume that the
transferred inventory is subject to SP1's perfected security interest, that the buyer commingles the inventory with existing or afteracquired inventory, and that SP2 has not yet taken a security interest. Because SP1 has a perfected security interest in the transferred inventory, section 9-315 awards SP1 a security interest in
the inventory that the buyer commingles with the transferred inventory. SP1 may enforce this security interest only to the extent
217. U.C.C. § 9-315(1)(a).
218. The comments to § 9-315 suggest that the section is limited to cases in which a
secured party's collateral contributes to a product in which there are conflicting claims. The
comments cite as examples cases in which different ingredients (such as flour and eggs) are
commingled into a product (such as cake) and in which components are assembled into a
machine. Professor Gilmore's discussion likewise ignores the possible application of § 9-315
to the commingling of different inventory from various sources by, for example, storing
identical inventory from different sources in a single warehouse without keeping a record of
which inventory came from what source. See 2 G. GIMoRE, supra note 30, at § 31.4. The
very few cases that have considered the issue have applied the section to commingled, fungible goods. See Peoples State Bank v. San Juan Packers, Inc. (In re San Juan Packers, Inc.),
696 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1983) (unprocessed vegetables of food processor); First Sec. Bank v.
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 537 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1975) (work in process, raw materials, and
stock in trade of electronics manufacturer).
Section 9-315 appears to codify the equitable rule that when the property of two persons is wrongfully mingled, equity will grant to each a proportionate share of the whole. See
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 214, 211 (1937). Although the rule is applied most often to
commingling of funds, it has been applied also to commingling of goods. See id. In their
brief commentary on McBee, Professors Leary and Frisch write, "A distinction can and
should be made between a secured party's property interest in the [inventory] itself, which
is transferred, and the interest, historically an equitable interest, in having the security interest attach to purchases made by one other than the debtor." Leary & Frisch, Uniform
Commercial Code Annual Survey: General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 39 Bus. LAw. 1851, 1903 (1984). Apparently, the equitable interest to which
they refer is the equitable lien that arises on commingling, which at least one of the authors
believes is codified in § 9-315. See Frisch, UCC Section 9-315: A Historical and Modern
Perspective, 70 MINN. L. REv. 1, 24 (1985). Professor Frisch's article traces the development
of the doctrine of confusion as well as the drafting history of § 9-315.
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of the value of the goods transferred.21 9 SP2's security interest,
once it attaches, is subordinate to SP1's to the extent of the value
of the goods transferred; that is, SP2 is entitled to the balance of
the value of the inventory up to the amount of its advances. If the
buyer in bulk acquires and commingles additional inventory between the time SP2's interest attaches and the filing of the buyer's
bankruptcy petition, SP2 would be entitled to the value of that
inventory as well. As long as the buyer in bulk acquires, but does
not sell, inventory then SP1 would have priority in an amount
equal to the value of the collateral transferred, and SP2 would be
entitled to the remainder.
A simple example will make this clear. Assume that B owns no
inventory and has no secured lender. As the result of a bulk sale, B
acquires inventory worth $10,000 subject to SPI's perfected security interest. As B acquires new inventory and commingles it with
the transferred inventory, SPI's security interest attaches to the
mass. Suppose that as of the date SP2 takes its security interest
from B, B has $12,000 in inventory-10,000 of which was received
in the bulk sale and $2000 of which was acquired thereafter. Notwithstanding the language of section 9-315(1), SP1 should be able
to enforce its security interest only in $10,000 of the collateral.2 0
SP2 is entitled to the remaining $2000. As B acquires more collateral and commingles it, SP2's share increases, so that if B increases
his commingled inventory by $3000, SPI's share remains $10,000,
and SP2's becomes $5000.
Section 9-315(2) is designed to resolve priority disputes in
commingled goods; unfortunately, it does not work in the case
under discussion. 221 To avoid dealing with subsection (2) alto219. Nothing in § 9-315 limits the secured party's interest in the mass that includes
his collateral to the value of the collateral commingled. There seems to be no reason to
enable an undersecured secured party to improve his position as a consequence of the
debtor's wrongdoing, and that result would be contrary to analogous equitable principles.
See RESTATEMENT OF REsTrUTION § 214 & comment a (1937); cf. id. § 209 (rule regarding
commingling of money). Professor Frisch has reached the same conclusion. See Frisch,
supra note 218, at 41-45.
220. See supra note 219.
221. Section 9-315(2) provides: "When under subsection (1) more than one security
interest attaches to the product or mass, they rank equally according to the ratio that the
cost of the goods to which each interest originally attached bears to the cost of the total
product or mass." Presumably, "the cost of the goods to which [SP1's] security interest
originally attached" is the cost of the goods before any commingling, or $10,000. Inasmuch
as SP2 took a security interest in all the inventory, "the cost of the goods to which [SP2's]
interest originally attached" would seem to be "the cost of the total. . . mass," or $12,000.
If so, SP2's security interest cannot "rank equally" with SP1's, because the sum of the "ratio[s] that the cost of the goods to which each interest originally attached bears to the cost
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gether, one can argue that SP2's security interest did not attach to
the mass by virtue of commingling "under subsection (1)," but
rather by virtue of its security agreement under sections 9-201 and
9-203(1). Under this approach, section 9-315(2) by its terms does
not apply, and one must look elsewhere, to equitable principles, to
resolve the priority dispute.2 2 2 When the buyer does not sell any of
the commingled inventory, those principles award priority to SP1
in an amount equal to the value of the collateral transferred. The
McBee court awards priority to SP1 in that amount, but it does so
on grounds that I have suggested are erroneous. Whether the facts
of McBee would support the court's result on appropriate grounds
is dubious. The court's opinion, like that of the bankruptcy judge
who heard the case, makes no reference to any commingling having
occurred, let alone a commingling that prevented identification of
the transferred inventory.2 2 3 Considering the nature of the assets
transferred-the inventory of a gun shop-the absence of any reference appears not to have resulted from oversight. Moreover, even
if the requisite commingling occurred in McBee, the following paragraph demonstrates that the court's result would not obtain when
some of the commingled collateral is sold and replaced with newly
acquired inventory.
Section 9-315(2) does not purport to give guidance for cases in
which portions of the commingled mass are sold. Presumably, the
pre-Code result will obtain, and the competing secured parties will
share in the remaining collateral as they did in the whole mass
before sale.224 To continue with the previous example, assume that
of the total . . . mass," 10/12 plus 12/12, is greater than one. To reach the correct result
under the subsection, one must assume that SP2's security interest "originally attached"
only to the $2000 of value that SP1 could not reach. Any other manipulation of the formula
would give SP2 a windfall. For example, SPI and SP2 may "rank equally" in the ratio that
each party's interest bears to the total amount of claims. Thus, if SP1 has an interest to
secure $10,000 of debt, and SP2's interest secures $12,000, then SPI would receive 45.45%
(10/22), and SP2 would receive 54.54% (12/22). Or one may argue that SPI has no interest
in $2000 of the inventory, which goes to SP2. As to the remaining $10,000, the parties "rank
equally." SP1 would receive $5000, and SP2 would receive $7000. For discussions of some
difficulties in the application of § 9-315, see 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 30, at § 31.4; D. BAIRD

& T. JACKSON,

SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 465-74

218, at 53-57.
222. See U.C.C. § 1-103
equity supplement the Code).
supra note 218, at 48-52.
223. See National Bank
1316 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'g In

224. See

(1984); Frisch, supra note

(unless displaced by particular Code provisions, principles of
Professor Frisch has reached a similar conclusion. See Frisch,
v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d
re McBee, 20 Bankr. 361 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982).

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

§ 214 comment a (1937); cf. id. § 213(1) &

comment c (rules regarding commingling of money).
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B owns $15,000 of commingled inventory, of which SP1's share is
$10,000 and SP2's is $5000. If B sells $6000 of the inventory, then
SP1 and SP2 will share in the remaining $9000 as they did in the
$15,000; that is, SP1 will receive two-thirds ($6000) and SP2 will
receive one-third ($3000). As B acquires new inventory and commingles it, SP2's share will increase. Suppose that $11,000 of new
collateral is added to the $9000 remaining. Because SP1's interest
attaches to the goods when they are already encumbered by SP2's
security interest, the extent of SP2's share of the mass should be
increased by the $11,000 of newly added value. 25 Thus SP2 will be
entitled to 70% (14/20), and SP1 to 30% (6/20). When B subsequently sells $10,000 of the commingled collateral, SP2's share of
the $10,000 balance will be $7000 and SP1's share $3000.
The example shows that, absent unusual circumstances, SP1's
share of the collateral can be expected to shrink over time. Thus,
even assuming that the buyer in McBee continuously commingled
new inventory with the goods he received in the bulk transfer, the
holding of McBee-that SP1 automatically has priority over SP2
in an amount equal to the value of the transferred goods-most
likely would not comport with section 9-315 and related equitable
226
principles.
225. SP2's interest attaches as soon as the debtor has rights in the collateral. U.C.C.
9-203(1). SPI will acquire no interest in the new inventory until later, when the debtor
commingles it. Id. § 9-315(1). The lowest intermediate balance rule provides a useful analogy. It applies when one person wrongfully commingles his fungible goods with those of
another person, diminishes the amount of the mass below the amount of the other person's
goods, and subsequently adds his goods to the mass. Under that rule, the other person ordinarily is entitled to no more than the amount on hand before the additional goods were
commingled. RESTATEMENT OF REsTITUTION § 214 comment a (1937); cf. id. § 212 & comment
a (applying the lowest intermediate balance rule to commingled money). Courts have applied the lowest intermediate balance rule to Code cases in which a secured party's proceeds
are commingled in a bank account. E.g., Universal C.LT. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358
F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
226. In McBee only a few months passed between the transfer in bulk (May 5, 1980)
and SP2's filing of a financing statement (July 16, 1980), and between SP2's filing and the
buyer-debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition (Oct. 22, 1980). 714 F.2d at 1318-19. Thus SP1
may have been entitled to a very large share of the inventory under the analysis offered in
the text. Professor Westbrook suggests that McBee "might have turned on the application
of the last sentence of section 9-402(7)," which relates to continued perfection of a security
interest in goods transferred by the debtor. Westbrook, Glitch: Section 9-402(7) and the
U.C.C. Revision Process, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 408, 412 n.17 (1984). To this extent, his
position is consistent with an argument advanced in the text: SPI's perfected security interest continues as a perfected interest notwithstanding the bulk transfer. See supra notes 64102 and accompanying text. When he applies § 9-402(7) to the facts of McBee, Westbrook
uses the second sentence of the section, dealing with the effect on perfection of changes in
the debtor's name, even though the Fifth Circuit panel treats the case as a transfer of collateral and not a change of name. Compare Westbrook, supra, at 412 n.17 with In re McBee,
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Against a Buyer from the Buyer in Bulk

When the transferee from a buyer in bulk is himself a buyer
(B2), the Code's resolution of the competing claims of B2 and SP1
is clearer and less complex than its determination of the relative
rights of SP1 and SP2. Under both Article 9 and Article 6, when
the buyer in bulk acquires goods subject to the perfected security
interest of SP1 and then resells the goods, B2 takes subject to the
perfected security interest.
Article 9 provides that, in the absence of a statutory exception, a security interest continues in the collateral notwithstanding
an unauthorized sale. 227 The exception found in section 9-307(1)
enables buyers in ordinary course to take free of most security interests in inventory; however, it applies only to security interests
created by the buyer's seller. SP1's security interest was created
not by B2's seller (the buyer in bulk), but by the seller in bulk.
Accordingly, B2 acquires no greater rights than his seller had; he
takes the goods subject to SP1's perfected security interest.
Article 6 does not affect this result, even when a noncomplying
bulk sale has occurred. As discussed in connection with the rights
of SP2, section 6-110 enables certain good faith purchasers from
the noncomplying buyer in bulk to take better title than the buyer
had.22 8 But section 6-110 does not purport to give unencumbered,
good title in all cases. It cuts off only those rights that arise as a
consequence of noncompliance with Article 6. SP1's perfected security interest is effective against the buyer in bulk regardless of
whether the latter complies with Article 6. Section 6-110, then,
does not affect SP1's Article 9 rights.
3.

Against a Lien Creditor of the Buyer in Bulk

A creditor of the buyer in bulk may obtain a lien on the inventory through the judicial process. Creditors who acquire liens in
714 F.2d at 1322, 1323. This confusion may arise from a belief that the partids to the bulk
transfer in McBee set out to defraud the buyer's secured party and "structure[d the scam
as a transfer." Westbrook, supra,at 410 n.12. Had McBee involved a change of the debtor's
name rather than a transfer of the goods to a third party, the seller's secured parties would
have had perfected security interests in inventory that the debtor acquired during the four
months following the change and, if the financing statement did become seriously misleading, also in inventory that was acquired thereafter. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (second sentence). In
that event, the ordinary priority rules, which are designed for cases concerning a single
debtor, would apply.
227. U.C.C. § 9-306(2); accord id. § 2-403(1) (first sentence). Sales by a party other
than the original debtor are unlikely to be authorized.
228. See supra text following note 182.
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this way do not give value to the debtor in exchange for their liens,
in reliance upon the debtor's possession of the inventory. That any
particular items of inventory are in the debtor's possession when
the lien attaches is a fortuity. One would be surprised, therefore,
were the law to afford lien creditors any greater rights than it affords to good faith buyers, who are more likely to rely on the
debtor's possession of particular goods when they give value to the
debtor in exchange for those goods.
In this regard, neither Article 9 nor Article 6 contains any surprises. Section 9-201 provides that the security agreement, and
hence the grant of the security interest, is effective against creditors, and section 9-306(2) suggests that the security interest survives the judicial lien. 22 9 The negative implication of section 9301(1)(b), which awards lien creditors priority over unperfected security interests, is that a perfected secured party takes priority
over a person who becomes a lien creditor after the security interest is perfected. Inasmuch as the lien creditor does not acquire his
lien through a voluntary transaction, he is not a "purchaser" who
is entitled to the protection of section 6-110.30 But even if he were,
section 6-110 would afford him no protection against claims to the
goods arising from Article 9, such as SP1's perfected security
interest.231
B.

The Rights of an Unperfected Secured Party

1. Against a Secured Party Whose Debtor Is the Noncomplying
2 2
Buyer in Bulk Part III. B. discusses whether a noncomplying buyer in bulk
acquires goods free of an unperfected security interest held by the
seller's secured party (SPI). It concludes that the better rule is
that the security interest survives. 233 If the buyer then grants a se229.

The suffering of a lien is arguably an "other disposition" of the collateral. U.C.C.

§ 9-306(2).
230. Id. § 1-201(33), (32). But see infra note 251.
231. See supra text following note 182.
232. A complying bulk buyer ordinarily takes free of an unperfected security interest.
See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text. The rare case in which a bulk buyer complies with Article 6 but nevertheless takes the goods subject to an unperfected security interest, see U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c), will be governed by the Article 9 analysis suggested in this
subpart.
233. Even if the noncomplying buyer were eligible to take free of SP1's unperfected
security interest, the interest would survive to the extent that the buyer does not "give[]
value and receive[] delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest and
before it is perfected." U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c). The Article 9 analysis suggested in this subpart
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curity interest to his creditor (SP2), a priority dispute may arise.
This dispute is similar to the priority disputes, discussed above in
part IV. A.1., that may arise when SP1 is perfected. The analysis
of those disputes showed that, because SP1's perfected security interest survives a bulk sale regardless of whether the buyer complies
with Article 6, one must look only to Article 9 to resolve the competing claims. I argued that Article 9 should be read to award priority to SP1, even if SP2 is the first to file or has a purchase
money security interest. When SP1's security interest is unperfected, Article 6 arguably comes into play and yields the opposite rule: SP2's rights are superior, even if SP1 perfects after the
transfer and is the first-or the only-party to file.
Section 6-110 is the cause of this anomalous outcome, in which
a perfected SP1 is subordinate to an unperfected SP2. That section, which is set forth above, 34 specifically addresses the subsequent transfer of property that was the subject of a bulk sale. It
enables "a purchaser for value in good faith and without. . . notice" of the buyer's noncompliance with Article 6 to take free of a
"defect [in the buyer's title] by reason of [the buyer's] non-compliance." But for the buyer's failure to comply with the requirements
of Article 6, SP1's unperfected security interest would not survive
the bulk sale. The security interest appears to be a "defect by reason of [the buyer's] non-compliance," and SP2, as a good faith
purchaser for value and without notice, "takes free" of it. 2s5 Section 6-110 does not require that a purchaser cure the ostensible
ownership problem as a condition to qualifying for good-faithpurchase protection. It appears, then, that SP2's security interest
prevails over SPl's even if SP1 later perfects by filing and SP2
does not.
The award of priority to an unperfected security interest over
a perfected security interest is not the only anomaly that section 6110 appears to create. The section treats SP2 more favorably than
Article 9 treats a similarly situated secured party whose debtor
does not buy in bulk but nevertheless takes goods subject to an
unperfected security interest. Assume, for example, that a buyer
takes delivery of equipment that he knows is encumbered by SP1's
unperfected security interest. Under section 9-301(1)(c), SPI's seapplies to these cases. The buyer in bulk virtually always gives value before taking delivery.
See id. § 1-201(44)(d) ("a person gives 'value' for rights if he acquires them ... in return
for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract").
234. See supra text following note 182.
235. U.C.C. § 6-110.
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curity interest survives. If the buyer grants a security interest to
SP2, a priority dispute may arise. I considered priority disputes
involving two debtors and a perfected SP1 above. 3 6 In that context I argued that to resolve those disputes properly, one cannot
rely on section 9-312, which apparently contemplates priority disputes concerning a single debtor. The ordinary rules work well,
however, when an unperfected secured party (SP1) is one of the
claimants. If both SP1 and SP2 are unperfected, the rule of section
9-312(5)(b) would award priority to SP1, whose security interest
was the first to attach. This result comports with the security of
property rule that applies generally to transfers of personal property.2 7 No reason exists for varying the rule to enable SP2 to acquire better rights than its transferor, the buyer, had. SPI's failure
to file may have misled SP2 into thinking that the goods were
unencumbered, but SP2 itself has created a misleading situation.23 s
If SP2 cures the ostensible ownership problem by filing before
SP1, then section 9-312(5)(a) will penalize SP1 and award SP2 priority as the holder of the first security interest to be filed or perfected.2 39 If SP1 files first, then it will take priority.240 The purpose
of section 9-312(5) is to award priority to the first secured party to
give public notice of his interest. The section thus works well, even
in a two-debtor case.
It seems, then, that Article 6 enables an unperfected SP2 to
236. See supra notes 174-226 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 55.
238. Although SP2's unperfected security interest will be secret, SP1, having extended
credit to the seller in bulk (SPi's debtor) prior to the transfer, is not likely to be among
those who are misled. If SP1 were to make a future advance while unaware of the transfer,
it would have had no reason to search for a financing statement in the buyer's name. SP2's
failure to file thus would be irrelevant. If, however, SP1 knew of the transfer, SP1 would be
foolish to make a future advance. See U.C.C. § 9-307(3) (buyer not in ordinary course "takes

free of a security interest to the extent that it secures future advances made after the secured party acquires knowledge of the purchase"). Thus SPI joins lien creditors and per-

fected secured parties who take their interests with knowledge of a prior, unperfected security interest as nonreliance creditors who benefit from Article 9's filing requirements. See id.
§§ 9-301(1)(b), 9-312(5).
239. Even if SP2 takes its security interest after learning of SPI's, SP2 still will prevail if SP2 is the first to file. See, e.g., In re Smith, 326 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Minn. 1971).

However, as I suggest below, SP2 may take subject to SP1's Article 6 rights if SP2 had
notice of the noncomplying bulk transfer at the time its security interest attached. See infra
text following note 241.
240. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a). SP1's filing should be effective to perfect its security
interest even though its debtor no longer has rights in the collateral. The security interest
has attached, id. § 9-203(1), and SP1 has given the requisite public notice, id. § 9-302(1).
See id. § 9-303; cf. id. § 9-402(7) (last sentence) (filed financing statement remains effective
notwithstanding transfer of the collateral).
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take priority over a perfected SP1 when SP2's debtor is a noncomplying buyer in bulk, but that Article 9 compels the opposite result
when SP2's debtor is a non-ordinary-course buyer with knowledge
of SPI's security interest. I can find no justification for arranging
the relative priorities of SP1 and SP2 according to the characteristics of SP2's debtor. The relative burdens on SP1 and SP2 to discover competing encumbrances on the goods are the same, regardless of why the buyer (SP2's debtor) took subject to SPI's
unperfected security interest. Accordingly, Article 9 draws no distinctions among the buyers who fail to qualify for the protection of
section 9-301(1)(c) or among their secured parties. As an Article 9
matter, the analysis I developed for a non-ordinary-course buyer
with knowledge applies equally to a noncomplying buyer in bulk.
The general rule in section 9-312(5) promotes the policies of Article 9 and should govern.
Although Article 6 appears to compel a contrary result, I
would not construe it in that manner. Affording good-faithpurchase protection to an unperfected SP2 conflicts with the major
goal of Article 6-to afford unsecured creditors of the seller an opportunity to recover their debts. Just as SP1's unperfected security
interest can be considered a defect by reason of the buyer's noncompliance with Article 6, so can a lien that an aggrieved creditor
of the seller acquires after the bulk sale. If section 6-110 allows
SP2 thereafter to take free of this lien, then the value of the opportunity that Article 6 affords to unsecured creditors of the seller
will be reduced considerably. 24 1 One ought not construe section 6110 to create an unnecessary disincentive to aggrieved creditors
who otherwise might exercise their Article 6 rights. Yet the reading
that I reject creates this disincentive by increasing the likelihood
that any expenditure incurred in locating the transferred goods
and obtaining a lien on them will be for naught.
Accordingly, I would construe section 6-110 in a manner that
both gives effect to the policies of Article 9 and is consistent with
those of Article 6. Specifically, I would limit the operation of section 6-110 by creating a definition for "defect [in the buyer's title]
by reason of his non-compliance with the requirements of this Article [6] 1 242 that permits the application of Article 9 to competing
241. Not only secured parties can cut off liens under the reading of § 6-110 that I
reject. Buyers from the bulk buyer also are § 6-110 "purchasers" and would be eligible to
take free of liens. See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text. Lien creditors of the bulk
buyer may present similar problems. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
242. U.C.C. § 6-110. This approach avoids any need to manipulate terms that are al-
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security interests while protecting aggrieved creditors of the seller.
I strongly suspect that the drafters of Article 6 did not consider the effect of a bulk transfer on an unperfected security interest, let alone intend to resolve the relative claims of the seller's
unperfected secured party and the buyer's secured party. Surely
the major title "defect" that the drafters addressed in section 6110 is the right of the seller's aggrieved creditors to assert claims
against the transferred goods. Unlike most title defects, that "defect" is not a property interest in, or claim to, specific goods.
Rather, the defect is only the risk that the aggrieved creditors will
acquire a property interest in the future. That risk is the penalty
that Article 6 imposes for noncompliance. In the first instance, the
penalty is effective only against the noncomplying buyer in bulk.
The creditors' rights are secret, difficult for third parties to discover, and most unusual.2 43 Rather than impose upon innocent
third parties the risk of failing to discover those rights, section 6110 solves this ostensible ownership problem by encouraging the
aggrieved creditors to locate the goods and assert their claims
quickly, lest they lose the goods to good faith purchasers for value
and without notice of the creditors' rights. Only those transferees
from the buyer who are or should be aware that they may be assisting him in removing the goods from the reach of the aggrieved
24 4
creditors take subject to the creditors' right to reach the goods.
In my view, the Code works best when the only "defect" that
section 6-110 addresses is the right of the seller's creditors to acquire property interests in goods that he has sold in bulk. Under
that reading, section 6-110 relieves qualified purchasers only from
the need to discover those extraordinary rights. It thereby cures
the ostensible ownership problem that is peculiar to Article 6 but
relegates the resolution of all other ostensible ownership problems
and competing claims to whatever other law is designed to address
those concerns. In the case under consideration, in which two seready defined, e.g., "purchaser" and "notice." See id. § 1-201(33); id. § 1-201(25).
243. The law of fraudulent conveyances creates similar rights. Cf. 1 G. GLENN, supra
note 23, § 314 (remedies under pre-Code bulk sales acts included remedies available to creditors aggrieved by a fraudulent conveyance).
244. Purchasers from the buyer who give no value also take subject to the rights of the
seller's aggrieved creditors, apparently on the theory that the assertion of those rights will
cause them little, if any, injury. The Article 6 treatment of purchasers from the bulk buyer
is generally consistent with the treatment of purchasers under the UNiF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9(1), 7A U.L.A. 577 (master ed. 1985), the proposed UNn?. FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT § 8(b)(2), 7A U.L.A. 662 (master ed. 1985), and the Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 550(b) (1982).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:179

curity interests compete, that law is Article 9. Section 9-312(5)
gives priority to the first secured party to file or perfect. Under my
reading of section 6-110, Article 6 does not conflict with that result. That section 6-110 ought not to be used to resolve conflicts
among secured parties does not mean, however, that the section
never affects the rights of SP1 and SP2. Suppose, for example,
that SP1's unperfected security interest survives a noncomplying
bulk sale and that SP2 takes and perfects its security interest with
notice of the buyer in bulk's (its debtor's) noncompliance. Under
my reading of section 6-110, Article 9 governs the priority of conflicting security interests, and it awards priority to SP2. Nevertheless, SP2's security interest will be subject to the defect in the
buyer's title that is peculiar to Article 6. That is, the seller's aggrieved creditors, including SP1, may use the judicial process to
acquire rights in the transferred goods, and any judicial lien they
obtain will take priority over SP2's security interest.
2. Against a Buyer from the Noncomplying Buyer in Bulk
Part IV. A.2. demonstrates that when a buyer in bulk acquires
the goods subject to a perfected security interest, the security interest (of SP1) continues when the goods are sold to a sub-buyer
(B2), even if B2 is a buyer in ordinary course. If SP1's security
interest is unperfected, however, the result may differ, and B2 may
prevail. Unfortunately, a literal reading of Article 9 and Article 6
does not always give what I believe to be the correct result.
Section 9-301(1)(c) subordinates an unperfected security interest to the rights of
a person who is ... a transferee in bulk or other buyer not in ordinary course
of business or is a buyer of farm products in ordinary course of business, to
the extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the collateral
without
45
knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected.2

One safely may assume that B2 gives value and takes delivery
without knowledge of SP1's security interest. Nevertheless, read
literally, section 9-301(1) (c) affords no protection to B2 if he is a
buyer of goods other than farm products in ordinary course of business. Nor can B2 benefit from the protection that section 9-307(1)
affords to buyers in ordinary course, because SP1's security interest was not created by his seller (the buyer in bulk). B2 thus falls
between the cracks. Ironically, B2 would be better off if he had
bought other than in ordinary course of business. In that case, he
245. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c).
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clearly would obtain the protection of section 9-301(1) (C).24 6
Prior to the 1972 revisions of Article 9, buyers of farm products in ordinary course of business similarly were left unprotected.
While explicitly excluded from the protection that section 9-307(1)
affords to buyers of inventory in ordinary course, ordinary course
buyers of farm products were not mentioned in the 1962 version of
section 9-301(1)(c). Professors White and Summers believe that
these buyers "were implicitly protected in that the section granted
superiority over unperfected secured creditors to less meritorious
claimants (buyers not in ordinary course). The 1972 amendment
corrects what we suspect was an unintended omission. ' ' 247 The
omission from section 9-301(1)(c) of the inventory buyers in ordinary course who do not prevail under section 9-307(1) likewise
seems unintended. When faced with this problem, a court should
resolve the casus omissus in B2's favor. 48
Previously I suggested that, in certain cases, Article 9 priority
rules are inappropriate when each competing claimant derives his
interest from a different person. 4 9 Application of section 9301(1)(c) to the competing claims of SP1 (whose interest derives
from the seller in bulk) and B2 (whose interest derives from the
buyer) is not one of those cases. The reason for enabling a person
who buys directly from the debtor to take free of an unperfected
security interest is that the secured party has created a potentially
misleading state of affairs. The ostensible ownership problem is as
great, if not greater, when B2 buys from a person who is not a
party to the secured transaction. Accordingly, B2 should be entitled to the protection of section 9-301(1)(c).
In most cases, Article 6 will give the same result, even under a
literal reading of section 6-110. As a good faith purchaser for value
and without notice of the buyer in bulk's noncompliance with Article 6, B2 will take free of SP1's unperfected security interest under
both articles. Suppose, however, that B2 has notice of the noncompliance, yet lacks actual knowledge of the unperfected security in246. This assumes that § 9-301(1)(c) applies to sales made by persons other than
SPI's original debtor. See infra text following note 248.
247. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 1033; accord B. CLARK, supra note 89, at
3-14. Another apparently unintended omission is the buyer in ordinary course of farm products in § 9-307(3).
248. Professor Carlson reaches the same conclusion, but is slightly more optimistic
about the capacity of the judiciary to resolve the problem properly. See Carlson, supra note

108, at 557 n.34 ("one can safely assume" that courts would extend section 9-301(1)(c) to
cover B2).
249. See supra notes 172-224 and accompanying text.
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terest. In that case, B2 will take subject to that "defect" under
section 6-110 yet take free of it under section 9-301(1)(c). As was
shown to be the case when SP1 competes with SP2, Articles 6 and
9 may be read to give different results. I would resolve the subbuyer cases by reading section 6-110 as I did in the SP2 cases; that
is, I would read "defect" to refer only to the potential claims of the
2 50
seller in bulk's creditors and not to existing property interests.
The reading gives effect to both Article 9 and Article 6. It enables
B2 to take free of SP1's unpublicized security interest, but subjects
him to rights of which he was, or should have been aware: the right
of his seller's aggrieved creditors, including SP1, to reach the
transferred goods through the judicial process.
3.

Against a Lien Creditor of the Noncomplying Buyer in Bulk

Section 9-301 speaks to the rights of lien creditors as well as of
certain buyers. Its subsection (1)(b) subordinates an unperfected
security interest to the rights of "a person who becomes a lien
creditor before the security interest is perfected." In our case, a
lien creditor of the seller in bulk would prevail over SP1's unperfected security interest. There seems to be no reason why a lien
creditor of the buyer in bulk likewise should not prevail. In both
cases, the party whose interest is not properly disclosed loses to
the party whose interest is publicized by actual or constructive
possession. Article 6 arguably contains nothing to the contrary, inasmuch as section 6-110 affects only the rights of "purchasers,"
'251
and a lien creditor is not a "purchaser.
250. See supra text following note 241. A case in which B2 has actual knowledge of
SPI's unperfected security interest but lacks notice of his seller's noncompliance with Article 6 is hard to imagine. If it were to arise, I would resolve it by giving effect to Article 9.
251. See Mazer v. Williams Bros. Co., 461 Pa. 587, 337 A.2d 559 (1975); U.C.C.
§ 1-201(33), (32). Under fraudulent conveyance law and pre-Code bulk sales acts, a lien
creditor of the transferee takes priority over aggrieved creditors of the transferor whose
liens attached subsequently. See, e.g., City of New York v. Johnson, 137 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.
1943) (awarding priority to transferee's bankruptcy trustee under both the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and New York Bulk Sales Act); 1 G. GLENN, supra note 23, § 238. Both
Code cases that have considered the issUe directly rule in favor of the bulk transferee's lien
creditor (the trustee in bankruptcy), albeit without confronting the language of § 6-110. In
re Dee's, Inc., 311 F.2d 619, 622 n.5 (3d Cir. 1962) (citing § 6-110, U.F.C.A. § 9, and Stat. 13
Eliz.); In re Gruber Indus., 345 F. Supp. 1076, 1077-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (discussing Johnson
and citing In re Dee's and a pre-Code bankruptcy case). Those cases are consistent in result
with the principle developed supra text accompanying and following notes 233-48: competition between property interests in goods that are the subject of a bulk transfer should be
resolved by non-Article 6 law. The commentaries recognize the need to deal with § 6-110 but
disagree about how to do so. Compare R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES & BULK TRANSFERS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMRCIAL CODE

[3A Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Service]
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V.

CONCLUSION

Articles 6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code are designed
to prevent different frauds. Each article does so by requiring the
transferees of interests in personal property to publicize the transfers and by penalizing persons who fail to comply. In most cases in
which the two articles come into play, a close reading of the Code
yields a sound result. Occasionally, the Code's answer is uncertain
or the outcome it appears to yield is inconsistent with well-established Code principles. In those cases, I have suggested that courts
resolve disputes in a manner that promotes the underlying policies
of each article at the least cost.
Most of the difficult issues arise when the seller in bulk's secured party fails to perfect its security interest. Three small adjustments in the Code would clarify matters immeasurably. First,
the Code should state unambiguously whether an unperfected security interest survives a noncomplying bulk sale. Because the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws currently is reconsidering Article 6, that article is the more
appropriate short-term location for the rule. Second, Article 6
should specify that its protection of good faith purchasers addresses only the right of aggrieved creditors to reach goods transferred in a noncomplying bulk sale and does not affect property
rights that are regulated elsewhere. Finally, in view of the case law
and the variety of approaches to the problem already suggested,
Article 6 should deal directly with the rights of a lien creditor of
the bulk buyer. 52
A number of issues that arise in connection with bulk sales
may arise in a variety of other contexts. Particularly important are
cases in which different debtors create competing security interests
in the same collateral.2

53

The reasoning of this Article can provide

§ 15.08, at 15-60 to -61 (1984) (approving result in In re Dee's on the ground that the
express protection § 6-110 affords to subsequent good faith purchasers should not be held to
exclude protection for subsequent lien creditors) and Weintraub & Levin, Bulk Sales Law
and Adequate Protection of Creditors, 65 HARv. L. REV. 418, 432 (1952) (changes in preCode law are undesirable and probably unintended notwithstanding § 6-110) with 6 W.
HAWKLAND, supra note 43, § 6-110:01, Art. 6 at 133 (GruberIndus. was incorrectly decided;
Code definition of "purchaser" as used in § 6-110 supersedes pre-Code cases, with which In
re Dee's is erroneously grouped) and J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 776 (although
a lien creditor may be a "purchaser" for purposes of § 6-110, a "judge-made priority rule
generally favoring the transferor's creditors would be more consistent with Article Six").
252. See supra note 251.
253. See supra notes 174-226, 233-44 and accompanying text. A special amendment to
clarify that § 9-312 does not apply to cases in which each secured party has a different
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guidance in those contexts, when the Code's underlying principles
clearly dictate a sound result but its precise language does not.

debtor might be helpful, but I see no pressing need for it. Cf. Oldfather, supra note 182, at
584 ("My suggestion is that some statutory clarification would seem to be called for.");
B. CLARK, supra note 89, at 3-54 ("the language is ambiguous enough to suggest the need
for amendment").

